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This thesis explores the role of the Catholic Church in Angola and compares it to 
the influence of the Church in two other former Portuguese colonies: Mozambique and 
Brazil. More specifically, this thesis asks how the Catholic Church has permeated each 
society and spread the values and rights pronounced by the Second Vatican Council. 
Using a comparative case study methodology, this thesis investigates why the influence 
of the Church, specifically with respect to the development of rights and freedoms, was 
weaker in Angola than in Brazil and Mozambique despite a common colonial and 
religious heritage. The analysis suggests that state resistance to international influence, or 
gatekeeping, is a significant factor in understanding the relationship between 
transnational actors and civil society, as suggested by the boomerang pattern. Rents from 
resource revenue enabled Angolan elite to sustain their gatekeeping efforts longer than 
others. This argument suggests the need to bring together theories of transnational 
advocacy and the resource curse to better understand when and why transnational actors 
influence domestic politics. These insights offer potential lessons to policy makers as 
they search for opportunities to effectively promote liberal democracy and constructively 
engage states in the developing world. 
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On September 25, 2015, Pope Francis addressed the General Assembly of the 
United Nations by reminding them that “the work of the United Nations, according to the 
principles set forth in the Preamble and the first Articles of its founding Charter, can be 
seen as the development and promotion of the rule of law, based on the realization that 
justice is an essential condition for achieving the ideal of universal fraternity.”1  In doing 
so, he tied the mission of the UN, a current western institution, to the Catholic Church, 
one of the oldest existing western institutions. This mission, which the Church has 
championed since the Second Vatican Council, promotes political and economic rights 
for marginalized societies since the 1960s 
The Catholic Church has been a significant international influence since the time 
of the Roman Empire. By 1500, during the height of papal influence in Europe, Portugal 
began expansion overseas. In doing so, the Portuguese Empire brought the influence of 
the Church with them. Since the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) in the 1960s, the 
Church has become more focused on social issues, such as poverty eradication and 
human rights advocacy, rather than exclusively concentrating on conversion and 
patronage.
2
 Although we would expect this focus to result in a broadening of social rights 
and freedoms, the Church’s influence in Angola has been limited compared to Brazil and 
Mozambique. This stark contrast leads one to ask why the Church’s influence in the 
realm of social rights has varied across former Portuguese colonies. Put another way, 
what explains the variation of the impact of Catholic social teaching in these countries? 
This thesis analyzes what forces propel and counteract the Church’s influence by 
comparing Angola to Mozambique and Brazil and investigates the processes through 
which the Church’s influence has been more or less powerful. 
                                                 
1Pope Francis, “Address of the Holy Father in Meeting with the Member of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations Organization” (New York, September 25, 2015), 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2015/september/documents/papa-
francesco_20150925_onu-visita.html. 
2John Frederick Schwaller, The History of the Catholic Church in Latin America: From Conquest to 
Revolution and Beyond (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 227–229. 
 2 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Investigating the variation of the influence of Catholic Church will contribute to 
the general body of knowledge in three areas. First, it is an example of the impact of 
international non-state actors. Historically, the study of international relations has been 
focused on the state as the unit of analysis.
3
 However, other actors have become more 
common. The rise of non-state actors should not be misconstrued as a decline of 
sovereignty in states,
4
 but rather as a function of competing interests between societies 
and states. Within this political space, the Catholic Church, along with other religions, 
acts to influence societies throughout the world. Moreover, other actors can fill this 
political space, such as military organizations which are either unaffiliated or only 
loosely governed by state institutions. The influence of non-state actors on society may 
spread through military indoctrination just as easily as through religious evangelization. 
Second, this study will shed light on how and why societies institutionalize 
religious values. Due to advancing technology, geography is no longer as strong a 
constraint to religious leaders as it was the colonial era. Just as colonialism expanded the 
Church, so has globalization. As the global economy penetrates foreign markets, it 
exposes the western world to social injustices in developing nations. The Church’s 
relatively recent focus on rights and freedoms and its long missionary history suggest that 
it is an institution well equipped to address the needs of the poor and oppressed in the 
developing world. The structure that the Catholic Church, or any other religion, adopts to 
engage societies affects its relationship with the state, serving as a political and cultural 
force that can shape the development of democratic governance and social rights. 
Third, the Catholic Church is one of many institutions that influence states and 
peoples from a normative perspective. The Catholic Church does not hold a monopoly on 
religion in Africa and competes with Evangelical Christians, various interpretations of 
Islam, and other religions in some ways. Where these religions intersect, the values they 
espouse may not only conflict with the state, but also with each other. As societies 
                                                 




confront social issues such as polygamy, violent extremism, and discrimination along the 
line of race, religion, and sexual orientation, the social values expressed by different 
religions may fuel grievances and cause increased tensions. The state, as the guarantor of 
security within its borders, may act to extinguish any violence between groups out of 
concern for security rather than simply as resistance to influence.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
After the fall of the Portuguese empire, the variation in the Catholic legacy in its 
former colonies is substantial in many ways. This thesis examines this legacy with 
respect to differences in economic freedoms and social rights observed in former 
Portuguese colonies. In the 1960s, just as Africa was emerging from European control, 
the Catholic Church was redefining its stance on social rights and freedoms in the Second 
Vatican Council. Specifically, the Church began to identify property rights, labor 
freedom, and poverty alleviation as goals rather than just evangelization.
5
 Focusing on 
Angola, and comparing its level of individual rights and freedoms as measures of social 
influence to Mozambique and Brazil, this thesis evaluates how the Catholic Church 
attempted to embed itself within different societies and how states mediate the 
relationship between the Church and society. To understand how Catholic values 
regarding social rights permeate societies, I describe the relevant social teachings of the 
Church, then identify what characteristics a country would have if these traits were 
realized, as well as the processes used to diffuse Catholic norms through societies. Once 
the specific values of social rights are delineated, I present two potentially compatible 
models of value diffusion between transnational organization and societies. Finally, in 
order to challenge existing ideas of cultural diffusion, I discuss the way that state actions 
may preempt international influence on society.  
                                                 
5Jodok Troy, “‘Catholic Waves’ of Democratization? Roman Catholicism and its Potential for 
Democratization,” Democratization 16, no. 6 (12, 2009): 1094, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340903271753. 
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1. Catholic Social Teaching  
The Catholic Church began its focus on social rights and freedoms in 1891 when 
Pope Leo XIII wrote Rerum Novarum.
6
  His focus was the dehumanizing threat of 
spreading communism.
7
 Specifically noting the issues of labor freedom and property 
rights, Leo XIII laid the groundwork for future popes to actively engage with social 
issues.
8
 While other pontiffs continued this tradition, it was not until Vatican II that social 
advocacy became the doctrine of the Church.
9
  
Pope John XXIII convened Vatican II, which lasted from 1962 through 1965, in 
order to reevaluate several church practices.
10
 Within the changes of reform, the Catholic 
Church produced several documents detailing the call for greater engagement.
11
 Gaudium 
et Spes (1965) directed “increased ecumenical dialogue and promotion of human rights 
and social justice.”12 Dignitatis Humanae (1965) promoted religious liberty and 
“accepted that salvation could occur outside the Catholic Church.”13 Ad Gentes (1965) 
“emphasized a greater appreciation of other cultures and solidarity with the local 
people.”14 In 1964, the church published Lumen Gentium, which identified laypersons 
rather than ordained ministers as the fundamental body of the Church.
15
 These four 
documents deconstruct the previous paradigm of the Church as a necessary intermediary 
between God and man. They each underscore the value of individuals, other religions, 
and nonreligious organizations as important in bringing dignity to each person.   
                                                 
6Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (Rome: May 15, 1891), 1, http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-
xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html. 
7Ibid., 4. 
8Ibid., 9, 13, 38, 45, 49. 
9Troy, “‘Catholic Waves,’” 1094. 
10Ibid., 1096. 
11Barbra Mann Wall, Into Africa: A Transnational History of Catholic Medical Missions and Social 






In Populorum Progressio (1967), Pope Paul VI “advocated for all people to have 
an increased standard of living,” while also calling for development in the postcolonial 
world.
16
 He defines social justice as “complete humanism,” and focuses on poverty 
reduction, noting that “development cannot be limited to merely economic growth.”17 
Africae Terraru (1967), while not a specific product of Vatican II, continued the theme of 
social engagement with the people of Africa. In this document, Paul VI likened global 
Christian virtues to traditional African values and called for increased education and food 
production to meet the needs of African peoples.
18
 Continuing the advancement of the 
Catholic Church’s social agenda, Paul VI became the first pope to visit Africa, doing so 
in 1969.
19
 Meeting with bishops from across the continent the pope reiterated the 
message that the Church needed to embed itself among the people and culture of the 
locals.
20
 One of the most drastic reforms of the Church that enabled this embeddedness 
was the switch the language of worship from Latin to vernacular languages prescribed 
during Vatican II.
21
 By the end of the 1960s, the Catholic Church, which had previously 
thought of itself as the exclusive savior of souls, had rebranded itself as a socially based 
service committed to social justice and human dignity. The social teaching that the 
Church sought to promote included the ability of each individual to achieve not only 
salvation, but also economic freedom and a reduction of poverty through fair property 
rights and labor freedom.  
Despite the reorientation of the Catholic Church during Vatican II, central 
authorities within the Catholic Church did not entirely align with the perception of many 
within the developing world. Liberation Theology, formed by the Latin American 
Bishops’ Conference at the Council of Medellin in 1968, advocated political and 
economic freedoms, a “preferential option for the poor,” and reduced dependency on the 
                                                 
16Wall, Into Africa, 20; Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio, (Rome, March 26, 1967), 61, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_populorum.html. 
17Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio, 14, 42. 





industrialized world, but has increasingly been viewed as a radicalized, Marxist-leaning 
form of Christianity.
22
 These concepts spoke directly to the developing world as it was 




The Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith, led by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, 
issued a denunciation of many aspects of Liberation Theology on behalf of the Church in 
1984.
24
 Despite its rejection of Liberation Theology, the Church continues to proceed 
with a mission of social justice to the present day. With the social mission intact, one 
would expect the Catholic Church to have a positive influence on personal freedoms, 
human rights, education, and poverty eradication throughout Africa and the developing 
world. It then follows that countries with a large Catholic following should demonstrate 
strong property rights, have a high degree of labor freedom, contain low levels of 
poverty, or have adopted policies to correct these issues in accordance with the Church’s 
mission. 
One potential connection between the Catholic Church’s focus on social justice 
and states in the developing world has received significant scholarly attention: 
democratization. Samuel Huntington describes the “Third Wave” of democratization as 
heavily influenced by reforms in the Catholic Church.
25
  Noting that other social, 
political, and economic factors bolstered the number of Catholic countries that 
democratized in the 1970s and 1980s, he credits Vatican II reforms for aligning the 
Church with the poor rather than the powerful.
26
 Jodok Troy echoes the theory that 
personal freedoms and public debate are supported by Catholic social doctrine, which 
therefore augments the self-determination that democracy provides.
27
 Accordingly, 
                                                 
22Schwaller, Church in Latin America, 246, 249, 259, 262. 
23Ibid., 246–251. 
24Ibid., 261. 
25Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 75–76. 
26Ibid., 76–78. 
27Troy, “‘Catholic Waves,’” 1105–1106. 
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Vatican II reforms and subsequent Church influence could have plausibly contributed to a 
rise in democratization.   
2. Transnational Advocacy and the Catholic Church 
To evaluate the role of the Catholic Church as an instrument of social justice, the 
Church can be viewed as a transnational advocacy group. The prevailing literature on the 
influence of transnational advocacy groups suggests that international influence on a 
society follows the “boomerang pattern.”28 In the boomerang pattern, transnational 
advocacy groups support oppressed or subjugated societies and pressure the oppressive 
state to provide freedoms or resources that have been withheld from society.
29
  Through 
the provision of direct support and international pressure on an oppressive state, the 
Church as a transnational actor can “make resources available to actors in domestic and 
social struggles” in order to provide relief and “promote target actors to adopt new 
policies.”30 The Church, through its mission of social justice, seeks to restore the basic 
rights and freedoms of these societies by targeting the state to change its policies.  
Obviously, this model of righting a perceived wrong implies that society is a 
victim subject to the power of the state. One fundamental component of the boomerang 
pattern is that the state, the supposed guardian of rights and freedoms, is the entity that 
violates the rights.
31
 Because the state is both the perpetrator of oppression and the 
arbitrator of the laws within its border, society has little recourse within the domestic 
paradigm.
32
 Implicit in the nature of a transnational advocacy group is that it is motivated 
by ideological values rather than self-interest.
33
 For the Church, this assertion appears 
self-evident as, since Vatican II, the Church has promoted a doctrine of social rights and 
economic freedoms. Intuitively, the structure of the Church also lends itself to 
                                                 
28Margaret E. Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 13, 14. 
29Ibid., 12–13. 
30Ibid., 1, 3, 25. 
31Ibid., 12. 
32Ibid. 
33Ibid., 1–2, 8–9. 
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international influence, led by the pope, and connections to society, through local priests, 
nuns, and missionaries.   
If the state is an obstacle to the rights of society in the boomerang pattern, 
democratic governance, or self-determination, should provide a check on the power of the 
state. While democratization is not synonymous with social justice, a state responsible to 
its citizens through elections has more incentive than an authoritarian regime to respect 
the rights of society. Addressing this point, Huntington quotes Pope John Paul II (1987): 
“I am not the evangelizer of democracy; I am the evangelizer of the Gospel. To the 
Gospel message, of course, belong all the problems of human rights; and if democracy 
means human rights, it also belongs to the message of the Church.”34  Therefore, as the 
boomerang pattern describes, the Church both supplied support directly to society, and 
put international pressure on states to liberalize.  
While the reforms adopted by the Catholic Church appear to be a contributing 
factor to the democratization of many states in the late twentieth century, the evidence is 
inconclusive. Other analysts have suggested that while the Vatican II reforms correlate to 
democratization, they are not causal. Rachel Riedl claims that “increasing religious 
pluralism as a result of political liberalization creates new opportunities for religious 
mobilization.”35 Michael Minkov and Geert Hofstede note that societal values align more 
closely with national identity that religious influence, suggesting that civil society is 
likely to be less swayed by a transnational advocacy group such as the Catholic Church.
36
 
These findings appear to dismiss the agency of the Church as a transnational actor and 
possibly reverse the cause and effect of the “Third Wave.”  While the Church has 
embraced democracy as a possible avenue for the advancement of rights and freedoms, 
                                                 
34Huntington, Third Wave, 84.  
35Rachel Beatty Riedl, “Transforming Politics, Dynamic Religion: Religion’s Political Impact in 




36Michael Minkov and Geert Hofstede, “Nations Versus Religions: Which Has a Stronger Effect on 
Societal Values?” Management International Review 54, no. 6 (12, 2014): 813, 821, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11575-014-0205-8.  
 9 
democratization in this context may be described as an amoral process that limits state 
power within the boomerang pattern rather than advancing Church influence on society.   
3. State Sovereignty and Resistance  
One gap in the boomerang pattern is that it does not account for variation in the 
influence of transnational advocacy networks in different countries. Despite the influence 
of the Catholic Church and other organizations to achieve social rights, these freedoms 
have not spread evenly throughout the developing world. While some of this variation 
may be due to countervailing cultural currents, such as the spread of Islam with a distinct 
moral code, predominantly Catholic countries lack a uniform adoption of personal 
freedoms that defies a simple explanation. Therefore, actions and reactions of the state, 
with respect to the pressure from transnational advocacy groups and civil society, must be 
explored in order to evaluate what impact a government has on the spread on the 
Church’s social influence. Additionally, the variation of the Church’s representation and 
structure in different countries requires further investigation to determine how the Church 
is embedded within each society.  
While Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink see the national governments as the 
“targets” of transnational advocacy networks, there is also reason to believe that states act 
as “gatekeepers” mediating the interactions between international and domestic actors.37 
Specifically, the governments of states in the developing world can manipulate or limit 
the flow of tangible and intangible goods to civil society in order to maintain their hold of 
sovereignty and power.
38
 The potential gatekeeper role of states is especially relevant to 
sub-Saharan Africa, where control of resources is integral to neopatrimonial regimes.
39
  
In a clientelistic state, the gatekeeper’s resistance to international influence can 
compound repression and poverty created by a lack of public goods to society.  
                                                 
37Keck and Sikkink, Activists  Beyond Borders, 3; Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Democratic Reform in 
Africa (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 109. 
38Gyimah-Boadi, Democratic Reform, 109. 
39Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa,” 
Comparative Politics 16, no. 4 (July 1, 1984): 422–425, 430–431, 433, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/60975840?accountid=12702. 
 10 
African states were carved out in an environment in which sovereignty was 
favored over functionality. Between these states, “the general apprehension of externally 
promoted interference and subversion have disposed African governments to collaborate 
in maintaining their jurisdictions.”40 These “juridical states” were not formed out of a 
commonality between its citizens, but rather a mutual pact between states to avoid 
revolution.
41
 Consequently, any transnational influence, whether religious or secular, that 
undermines the state leader is due to meet resistance. African states have demonstrated 
that “activities that overshadow the state tend to be viewed as a direct challenge.”42 
Therefore, Church influence, like that of NGO’s, may lead to hardening of positions 
rather than an opening of the political and social space.
43
 
To protect their sovereignty, “governments have instituted control mechanisms” 
over NGOs.
44
 Creating bureaucratic channels to harness influence, “African governments 
have come to view NGOs . . . warily as political challengers whose benevolence needs to 
be directed and coordinated not to undermine the state.”45 Rather than grant NGOs, or the 
Church, unfettered access to civil society, the typical African state has created 
roadblocks. State resistance may be motivated by greedy elites seeking to exploit 
resources or simply be a negative consequence of poor governance lacking bad intent.  
In light of the strong potential for African states to act as gatekeepers within the 
boomerang pattern, this thesis examines why the Angolan government has become a 
particularly potent force in mediating the influence of the Catholic Church and the 
doctrine of social and economic freedoms. As described in the next section, this thesis 
will seek to understand the Catholic Church’s muted influence on rights and freedoms in 
                                                 
40Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the 
Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics 35, no. 1 (10, 1982): 18, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/61287144?accountid=12702. 
41Jackson and Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist,” 12. 
42Stephen N. Ndegwa, The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa (West Hartford, 
Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996), 21. 
43Much of the literature defining the relationship between state and civil society is framed within the 
context of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). I consider the Catholic Church to sufficiently fit the 
description of an NGO.  
44Ndegwa, Civil Society, 22, 23. 
45Ibid., 22. 
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Angola by examining the government’s impetus for acting as a strong gatekeeper as well 
as the influence of the Church’s structure and mobilization of society. 
C. HYPOTHESES AND ARGUMENT 
To explain the influence of Catholic reforms resulting from Vatican II on the 
social rights and economic freedoms in Angola compared to Mozambique and Brazil, I 
consider the following hypotheses as possible causes for the variation between the 
countries. First, the Catholic Church was more thoroughly embedded in Brazilian society 
than in Angola and Mozambique, so it was a more effective advocacy group within the 
boomerang pattern. Second, the Catholic Church was used as an instrument of state 
control for the Portuguese colonial power in Africa more than in Brazil, so Angolan and 
Mozambican societies rejected the Church as a remnant of foreign domination. Third, 
elite competition for power was more intense and long lasting in Angola than other 
colonies, so Angolan state and rebel elites acted as more effective gatekeepers, 
preempting the spread of Vatican II reforms. Fourth, the Angolan state exploited mineral 
resources to create an oppressive regime, which was unresponsive to social needs or 
reform, resisting the attempts of the Catholic Church to advocate for society  
I argue that these potential causes of limited Church influence are not mutually 
exclusive, but one factor contributed to the development and continuation of the others. 
First, the evidence available indicates that the Catholic Church was more deeply 
embedded in Brazil than Angola and Mozambique. However, this alone is not sufficient 
to explain why the Church has failed to successfully promote social rights in Angola. 
Second, the Church was used as a more significant instrument of colonial oppression in 
Angola and Mozambique than it was in Brazil. However, this did not lead to a permanent 
and outright rejection of the Church in these societies. Third, state and rebel elites did 
compete for power longer in Angola than other colonies. While elite competition did 
have a significant impact on society, the protracted civil war is not the root cause of the 
limited influence of the Church. Fourth, and most importantly, the Angolan state and 
rebels drew strength from the extraction of oil and diamonds, which were the most 
significant factors in the long duration of the intrastate conflict and the muted voice of the 
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Catholic Church in Angola. Greed on the part of the Portuguese colonists created a 
colonial structure that manipulated divisions between ethnic groups. Once these ethnic 
groups formed competing liberation movements, they turned their attention to resources 
rather than social rights. Fueled by extractive resources, state and rebel elites acted as 
gatekeepers that inhibited the influence of the Catholic Church and marginalized society. 
Therefore, state resistance to international influence, or gatekeeping, is the most 
significant cause of the extreme deprivation of social rights in Angola, because resource 
revenue enabled Angolan elite to sustain their gatekeeping efforts. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses a comparative case analysis of three former Portuguese colonies: 
Angola, Mozambique, and Brazil. Its main purpose is to examine Angola as an extreme 
case of the relationship of Catholic influence to social rights (low influence and low 
social rights). Comparisons with more typical cases, Mozambique and Brazil, offer 
contrasting contributing factors for the stated explanations for the Church’s muted 
influence in Angola. Because it is impossible to control for all variables other than 
Catholic influence, it is important to note the basic similarities and differences between 
these states and how the differences potentially affect the relationship between the 
Church’s teachings and spread of the associated social values.  
Each of these countries is a large coastal state that was once a Portuguese colony. 
Each of these countries achieved independence later than most of its neighbors and each 
has a population that is at least one-quarter Catholic.
46
 Angola is a country of nearly 24 
million people, of which about 38 percent are Catholic.
47
 More than 36 percent of 
Angolans live below the poverty line and many have been displaced by civil war that was 
eventually won by the state.
48
  
                                                 
46U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Factbook, 2013–2014 (Washington, DC, 2013), 
Accessed March 17, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. 
47Ibid. 
48The World Bank, World Data Bank, accessed March 17, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/. 
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Mozambique and Brazil vary significantly in location, population, and economies 
compared to Angola. Mozambique, like Angola, is a large, coastal African state. Twenty-
seven million people reside in Mozambique and more than half of them are below the 
poverty line.
49
 At the time of independence, and throughout their civil war, Mozambique 
had a largely undeveloped extractive sector, which contributed to their poverty.50 
Approximately one quarter of the population of Mozambique is Catholic.51 Brazil is 
much larger in both area and population than Angola and Mozambique.
52
 It has a lower 
poverty rate and higher percentage of Catholics than the two African states.
53
 Brazil is 
endowed with plentiful natural resources and has expanded its extraction capacity in 
recent decades.54 Since Mozambique and Brazil vary in different ways, they provide 
valuable perspective when compared to Angola with respect to social rights and 
economic freedoms. 
This thesis examines historical accounts of the Catholic Church in the three 
countries, the processes through which the adoption of social rights have been considered 
and quantitative data from various sources in order to measure the social rights and 
freedoms in each of the three states. By examining Angola as an extreme case compared 
to more typical cases, such as Mozambique and Brazil, this thesis seeks to analyze the 
previously mentioned hypotheses and develop a fuller explanation of the Church’s social 
impact since Vatican II. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into four chapters shaped by the four hypotheses 
previously mentioned. The second chapter focuses on the structure of the Catholic 
                                                 
49The World Bank, World DataBank. 
50Paul Jourdan, “The Minerals Industry of Mozambique, Institute of Mining Research (IMR) Open 
Report no. 117, Harare, (June 1990)” OpenDocs, accessed August 12, 2016, 5, 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/4647/Jordan,%20P.%20IMR%20Report
%20117.pdf?sequence=1. 
51U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Factbook.  
52Ibid. 
53The World Bank, World Data Bank; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Factbook. 
54Lyndon Thompson, “In Deep: Brazilian Oil” OECD Observer no. 297 (4, 2013): 33, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1503684461?accountid=12702.  
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Church as it is organized in Angola, Mozambique, and Brazil and therefore deals with the 
first two potential explanations, namely that the Church was more deeply embedded in 
Brazilian society than in African societies. For the Catholic Church to advocate 
successfully within the boomerang pattern, it must both establish solidarity with society 
and transcend state borders. Ultimately, this analysis should deepen the reader’s 
understanding of the Church as a functional component in the boomerang pattern in 
former Portuguese colonies. 
Chapter III explores the remaining two hypotheses. By investigating elite 
competition for power and state exploitation of resources, this chapter should frame the 
political and economic currents that counteract the spread of Vatican II reforms 
specifically, and more generally, social influence between cultures and civilizations. 
Rather than evaluating the connection between the Church and society, this chapter treats 
the state as an agentive actor in the boomerang pattern. Chapter III, consequently, relies 
heavily on the gatekeeper role of the state and its impact on society.  
Chapter IV concludes the thesis by drawing lessons from the previous two 
chapters and comparing the explanations of variance in the adoption of Vatican II 
reforms regarding social rights and economic freedoms. The ultimate goal is to evaluate 
the influence of the Catholic Church and the countervailing state actions to the study of 
social norms in Africa and the developing world. Moreover, this thesis may identify other 
critical factors that, in the diffusion of social rights, can potentially, hinder, aid, or 




II. CHURCH EMBEDDEDNESS IN SOCIETY 
The influence of the Catholic Church is concentrated in some areas and diluted in 
others rather than being uniformly accepted across global societies. How a religion 
embeds itself in society is critical when evaluating the values it promotes. Therefore, the 
various means that the Catholic Church used to embed itself in Angolan, Mozambican, 
and Brazilian societies affects the extent to which these countries practice the social 
rights proclaimed by the Church after Vatican II. For the Church to act as a transnational 
advocate in the boomerang pattern, it must be accepted by society.  
What factors would lead to society accepting a church as its own? According to 
Anna Grzymala-Busse, a society’s willing acceptance of a church constitutes “moral 
authority,” which is characterized by the “popular perception that the church represents 
the national interest.”55 Moral authority is enhanced by the “fusion of national and 
religious identities,” but diminished when the church “cannot lay claim to the historical 
defense of the nation.”56 Consequently, the actions of the Catholic Church and 
perceptions of each society affect the level of moral authority it has. Moral authority can 
facilitate a church becoming embedded in a nation. Conversely, a lack of moral authority 
can hinder it. Therefore, the question becomes what has the Catholic Church done, or 
failed to do, in Brazil that makes it more representative of society than in Angola and 
Mozambique?  
I argue that the Catholic Church has not been embedded in Angola as long or as 
deeply as it has in Brazil, and to a lesser extent, Mozambique. The Church had 
historically been used as a cornerstone of Portuguese colonial domination longer in 
Angola and Mozambique than in Brazil. Whereas Brazil achieved independence in 1822, 
Angola and Mozambique gained independence in the 1970s.
57
 The Church has had a 
shorter timeframe in which to build moral authority since the end of Portuguese rule in 
                                                 
55Anna Gryzmala-Busse, “Weapons of the Meek,” World Politics 68, no. 1 (1, 2016), 3, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887115000301. 
56Ibid. 
57U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Factbook. 
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Angola and Mozambique. Whereas the Church has effectively made use of opportunities 
to cultivate moral authority and advocate for society in Mozambique, the Church has 
failed to capitalize on its attempts to represent society in Angola. To varying degrees the 
Church facilitated the Portuguese empire to act as a gatekeeper in different colonies, 
which subsequently hindered the Church’s embeddedness in society within postcolonial 
states.  
Conversely, throughout Brazil’s colonial and sovereign history, the Church has 
been alternatively courted and shunned by the state, which has provided it opportunities 
to intercede on behalf of society. When courted by an oppressive regime, they have 
resisted coercion and when shunned, they have maintained continual advocacy of society. 
Similarly, Brazilian clergy, and Latin American bishops in general, have not always 
conformed to papal guidance, which amplifies moral authority through resistance to 
foreign domination. Therefore, the Catholic Church in Brazil adheres to the boomerang 
pattern, but does so selectively. 
This chapter will trace the actions of the Church, first as a component of the 
Portuguese Empire, where it was closely intertwined with the state, and then in each of 
the former colonies. As the Church became embedded in Brazilian society after 
independence in the early nineteenth century, the Church built a strong foundation within 
society. Following the discussion of the Church in Brazil, Angola and Mozambique will 
be discussed as colonies of Portugal until the 1970s, and then as independent states. The 
comparison of these three countries illustrates that moral authority is built over time and 
requires effort on the part of the Church to become embedded in a culture if it was once 
seen as oppressive. Further, if a national identity has not been forged, the Church may not 
become embedded because there is a lack of unity among society, as in Angola.  
A. THE PORTUGUESE COLONIAL EMPIRE 
As former Portuguese colonies, Angola, Mozambique, and Brazil share a 
significant bond of colonial heritage. Portugal, along with Spain, established papal 
recognition and patronage within their colonies around the year 1500.
58
 The relationship 
                                                 
58Schwaller, Church in Latin America, 39–47. 
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between the Iberian empires and the Church predated the 1622 announcement of The 
Congregation for the Evangelization, also known as The Congregation for the 
Propagation of Faith.
59
 The Congregation, set forth the following goals: the separation of 
missionary works from colonial politics; the exclusion of every form of interference by 
the temporal powers in missionary concerns; the sending out of well-qualified and trained 
missionaries; the formation of indigenous priests; the consecration of native bishops”; 
and “adaptation to the customs and practices of the peoples.”60 In summary, the Catholic 
Church published this doctrine in order to remove the state as an intermediary between 
the Church and future colonial subjects.  
Patronage in Spain and Portugal had the opposite effect of the Congregation for 
the Propagation of Faith: the Church not only allowed the state to interfere, but also it 
depended on the state to fund and support missions.
61
 While patronage decreased the 
financial and logistical burden on the Church, it compromised the independence of the 
Church. The reliance of the Church on the state inherently favored the colonial empire 
over the colonized subjects. Therefore, while moral authority of the Church may have 
been high among the colonizers, with whom it was embedded, it was distinctly lower 
among the colonized.  
1. Brazil 
Brazil did not sign a concordat upon achieving independence in 1822. However, 
the Holy See recognized the new state in 1823, within one year of its independence.
62
 
The constitution of 1824 recognized the freedom of religion, but also held Catholicism as 
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 Patronage continued under the first Brazilian emperor, Dom Pedro I, 
where the state collected a tithe and paid the clergy.
64
 Perhaps the only reason a 
concordat was not reached was that when the pope agreed to the conditions Brazil had 
placed on the Church in 1827, Dom Pedro I refused to sign a treaty, claiming that the 
Church’s position was constitutionally granted and not subject to papal approval.65 
Despite lacking a concordat, Brazil did have a governing document for their agreement 
with the Church.  
In 1889, the emperor of Brazil was overthrown and a republican government 
came to power. The bishops of Brazil had increasingly distanced themselves from the 
unpopular emperor, thereby gaining credibility with society, but did not align with the 
new secular government. Consequently, they became gradually more united to the pope 
than the state. The result of the change of power in Brazil was a durable Church that was 
increasingly embedded in society and simultaneously more united with Rome.
66
 
The Brazilian bishops continually sought engagement with the pope. In 1894, Leo 
XIII wrote Litteras A Vobis, responding to their request for a larger episcopal hierarchy to 
better serve their population across the large country.
67
 In addition to increasing the 
number of bishops in Brazil, Leo XIII also counseled them to ensure religious education 
for children and keep missionaries and religious orders “subject to the authority of the 
bishops” rather than pursue independent objectives.68 Since the end of the imperial 
government in Brazil, the Church hierarchy has been collectively active engaged with the 
Vatican and active in domestic affairs despite being distanced from the government. 
Getulio Vargas rose to political power through a military coup in 1934 and 
rekindled the bond between Church and state: while he did not sanction a state religion, 
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66Ibid., 168–169, 205. 
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he did distinguish the “God of the people.”69 This recognition solidified the place of the 
Church in the state, affording the Church influence in society. Soon after Vargas was 
removed from the government in the 1950s, the bishops formally organized into the 
National Conference of Bishops (CNBB) and sparked the formation of a regional 
ecclesial body, the Latin American Bishops Conference (CELAM).
70
 A new military 
government took control of Brazil in 1964 and embraced the Church as a potential ally in 
resistance to the spread of communism.
71
 However, the junta used oppressive tactics to 
manipulate society and, beginning in 1967, targeted progressive clergy.
72
 Led by Bishop 
Helder Camara and Bishop Aloisio Lorscheider, the Church was one of the few voices 
that expressed opposition to the military state.
73
 Throughout the middle of the twentieth 
century, the Brazilian Catholic Church was able to remain an impartial advocate for 
society despite oppressive state action. When Vatican II delivered its call for justice and 
social rights, the Brazilian clergy were well positioned to deliver this message to a 
receptive society.  
The CNBB has remained influential and embedded in Brazil throughout the end 
of the twentieth century and into the new millennium. As of 1991, the Church had a 
higher level of public confidence than any other Brazilian institution.
74
 Bolstered by its 
history of activism, the Catholic Church demonstrates high moral authority in Brazil. The 
bishops created a four-year plan in 1996 known as the Way to the New Millennium, 
focusing on human rights ranging from civil liberties and social causes to economic 
means.
75
 As the twentieth century ended, the Catholic Church in Brazil retained its image 
as representative of society.  
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In 2011, Pope Benedict XVI welcomed Almir de Sa Barbuda as the Ambassador 
of Brazil to the Holy See. In his correspondence, the pope noted that the Church and 
Brazil have a long history dating back to 1500.
76
 This relationship, he claims, 
strengthened by the new concordat in 2008, is focused on “free exercise of worship,” 
education and social justice.
77
 Clearly, these functions that the Catholic Church continues 
to pursue in Brazil have created a credible impression on society to an extent that it has 
not in Angola.  
2. Portuguese Africa  
Angola and Mozambique fell under the jurisdiction of the Portuguese concordat 
of 1886, described later that year by Pope Leo XIII in the encyclical Pergata.
78
  In 
Pergata, Leo XIII calls for the continuation of patronage for the “prestige of the empire, 
and at the same time that the Christian interests of the Indians [colonial subjects] be 
provided for.”79 Ironically, the same pope, who would in 1891 call for social rights in 
Rerum Novarum, would extend the system of patronage despite the warning against the 
interference of secular power on missions declared by the Congregation for the 
Propagation of Faith. Specifically noting the “great need for sacred missions in the 
interior of Africa,”80 Pergata ends with a blessing and exhortation to continue the union 
between Portugal and the Catholic Church. For Portuguese colonies such as Angola and 
Mozambique, this indicated that the Church would continue patronage, which contributed 
to the Church being embedded with the metropole rather than colonial society.  
After the turn of the century, papal communication with Portugal reflected a 
different sentiment. Gravissimas (1901) urged the Portuguese bishops to “strenuously 
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defend the cause of religion and civil society” against the state decrees.81 Pope Pius X 
wrote Iamdudum (1911) in reaction to the separation of “Church and State” enacted by 
the new republican government of Portugal.
82
 Citing the violation of the concordat, 
including the withdrawal of public assistance for the Church and missions, Pius rejected 
the new law claiming that its goal was to separate the Portuguese bishops not only from 
the state, but also from the papacy.
83
 While the motive of the leaders of the new republic 
may have been to distance themselves from Rome in order to increase their influence and 
sovereignty in their territories, this arrangement would have made the Catholic Church in 
Portugal more similar to other the Church in other nations.  
The separation of Church and state would not last in Portugal and its overseas 
possessions. Under Antonio de Oliveira Salazar’s fascist government, Portugal would 
agree to missionary accord with the Church in 1940.
84
  This agreement reestablished 
patronage and gave the Church control of missionary education; however, this education 
for indigenous children generally only amounted to between one and three years of 
school and was focused on getting children to “abandon idleness and prepare themselves 
to become future agricultural and factory workers.”85 Not only was this education little 
more than an apprenticeship to forced service, Portugal also opposed schools run by 
protestant missionaries.
86
 Pope Pius XII released the encyclical Saeculo Exeunte Octavo 
in 1940 imploring Portuguese to continue “opening paths and laboring for the Church in 
the spacious lands of Africa.”87 Harkening back to the centuries of colonialism, this 
document anachronistically celebrates how the Portuguese “were able to dominate the 
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shores of Africa” through “ardent and strong faith.”88 Most bishops in Portuguese Africa 
often did little to veil their allegiance to Portugal over their mission to Africans. The 
bishops of Portuguese colonies in Africa did not attend the All Africa Bishops 
Symposium in 1969 because of their loyalty to the empire rather than colony.
89
 Analysis 
of the Catholic Church in colonial Angola and Mozambique prior to Vatican II reveals 
that the Church was compliant in Portuguese imperial subjugation of colonial societies. 
Due to the close ties between the Church and the Portuguese Empire, the Church could 
not objectively advocate for society in its colonies. This conflict of interests limited the 
Church’s moral authority in Portuguese colonies and effectiveness within the boomerang 
model.  
In the years leading to and after independence, individuals and organizations 
within the Catholic Church have attempted to restore its credibility in Angola and 
Mozambique just as they have in Brazil and elsewhere. However, the Church casts a 
large shadow in former Portuguese colonies and has failed to emerge from this shadow in 
Angola to the extent that it has in Brazil and Mozambique. The Church in Mozambique 
has developed some influence within society and among elites, which has contributed to 
increased rights and freedoms for society. In Angola, despite attempts to mitigate 
suffering caused by war and poor governance, the Church has failed to successfully 
advocate for the benefit of society. 
3. Angola 
In Angola, the Catholic Church cannot claim to have continuously backed society 
against foreign rule. One hindrance to the Church’s association to the national identity is 
that there is not one distinct national identity. The territory that constitutes present day 
Angola is primarily occupied by three separate ethnic groups: the Ovimbundu, the 
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Mbundu, and the Bakongo.
90
 The evangelization of the Catholic Church targeted none of 
these groups, favoring to focus on the Portuguese settlers.
91
 However, missionaries from 
other denominations began to reach the areas neglected by the Catholics: Baptists 
penetrated the North, Methodists took root in urban and central areas, and 
Congregationalists reached the southern Ovimbundu areas.
92
 The failure of the Catholic 
Church to proselytize to the entire country was a missed opportunity to form a national 
identity as well as to become embedded in it.  
Compounding the disinterest of the Portuguese in fully including the native tribes 
in the faith, Portugal granted independence to the “Angolan people,” in 1975 rather than a 
legitimately recognized government.
93
 By failing to anoint a successor, the Portuguese 
permitted the ethnic groups to compete for power, increasing the incentive for each to 
claim authority. The Mbundu formed the base of the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA), while the Ovimbundu rallied to the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the Bakongo largely entered the National 
Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA).
94
 Consequently, the neglect of the indigenous 
population by the Portuguese Catholic community reinforced divisions rather than unity 
in Angola. The moral authority of the Church has struggled to overcome its colonial 
legacy in Angola because it does not resonate with a true national identity and the rifts 
left in a neglected society have remained salient.  
The Catholic Church has grasped for social influence since Angola achieved 
independence. However, on a national level, the Church has had little success and when it 
did, it rarely did so alone. The goal of the Episcopal Conference for Angola and Sao 
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Tome (CEAST), which is the collection of Catholic bishops in the two countries, was to 
use democracy as a “path to peace and national reconciliation.”95 As early as 1975, a 
coalition of Catholic joined forces with one Methodist bishop to issue a statement 
promoting democracy as a solution to the competition between liberation movements 
rather than war.
96
 This document proved to be an exception as the various Christian 
churches in Angola tended to operate separately rather than ecumenically prior to the 
1990s. In fact, there was not another significant effort for joint church advocacy for peace 
until the creation of the Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA) at 
the turn of the century.
97
 Even after the creation of COIEPA, collaborative action 
between Protestant and Catholic leaders was sporadic. 
One reason that leaders of various churches failed to unite in common cause was 
that they traditionally had separate constituencies based on the missionary footprint of 
each different faith prior to independence. These divisions hardened into distinct ethnic 
bases which supported competing liberation movements, as previously mentioned. 
Consequently, Protestant churches found themselves aligned politically with factions 
fighting for a share of power, which compromised their objectivity in a negotiated 
settlement. The Catholic Church meanwhile had insufficient ties to these native ethnic 
groups based on the exclusiveness of their mission to the colonial Portuguese in Angola. 
Therefore, Protestant churches can be seen as embedded in the ethnic communities and 
entrenched in their competition for power while the Catholic Church was not sufficiently 
embedded within the ethnic communities that comprised Angolan society.
98
  
Beginning in the late 1980s, the Catholic Church became more active in 
advocating for the unification of society in Angola as a means to peace rather than 
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continued conflict. The first significant attempt to do so was the failed Gbadolite Accords 
in 1989.
99
 This was followed by the Bicesse Accords in May of 1991, which led to an 
internationally supported election in September of 1992.
100
 CEAST actively sought to 
make the most of this opportunity, encouraging all parties to accept the result of 
upcoming election, as a victor or opposition party, and calling for inclusion at the peace 
table for all segments of society, as only the belligerents of the conflict were given a 
voice.
101
 Prior to the election, CEAST also was outspoken of state and rebel media outlets 
that broadcast divisive, rather than conciliatory messages as well as the failure of both the 
MPLA and UNITA to disarm in accordance with the accords, and poor voter education 
and training.
102
 Despite the return to war, CEAST continued to advocate for society as the 
victim of the war between the two factions, and calling the conflict a “systematic 
violation of the most sacred human rights.”103 Between the Gbadolite Accords, the 
Bicesse Accords, the failed election, and the return to war, the efforts of the Catholic 
Church clearly failed to achieve secure rights and freedoms for society.  
Following the failed election in 1992, the Lusaka Protocol in November of 1994 
constituted the next substantive attempt for peace in Angola.
104
 Despite the 1997 
establishment of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN), this 
measure also failed to bring lasting peace to Angola and rights to society.
105
 A key 
development in church-state relations at this juncture was made by the Protestant 
churches in Angola as they began to distance themselves from political parties and 
instead advocate for society on issues rather than candidates.
106
 Leading this campaign 
was Methodist Bishop Emilio de Carvalho, the same Methodist bishop who signed the 
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ecumenical request for democracy in 1975; he called attention to the growing hostility in 
the political arena and increasing distance between the churches and policy makers.
107
 
While the Protestant churches began to recognize that the war in Angola was a form of 
“fratricide,” with factions of society destroying the others politically in times of peace 
and militarily in times of war, CEAST went a step farther: in 1996 CEAST called the war 
genocide.
108
 This accusation of state and rebel elite favoring power over the welfare of 
society, along with the shift of Protestant church leaders to advocacy of society, marked a 
the beginning of a collaborative effort of Christian churches in Angola. By speaking out 
against the war, and adopting a common message, the Christian churches in Angola 
became recognized by society as “the most legitimate and organized network for peace” 
in the country.109 While this can be read as the budding of moral authority in Angola, it is 
significant that the Catholic Church was not capable of this progress on its own and that 
the churches were not successful in delivering rights and freedoms to society through the 
end of the civil war.  
As the Lusaka deal crumbled and war began to reemerge in Angola in 1998, the 
churches of Angola attempted to seek an end to violence, but failed to consistently reach 
a consensus and act in unison. In 1999, Catholic Cardinal Dom Alexandre do Nascimento 
issued a pastoral letter allowing seminary students to enlist in the military, only to reverse 
this position in an ensuing publication condemning the renewed war.
110
 At roughly the 
same time, Protestant and Catholic leaders joined to form COIEPA to offer a united voice 
on behalf of society, but subsequently continued to operate independently within 
Angola.
111
 Acting unilaterally, CEAST sponsored the Movement For Peace and hosted a 
peace conference in 2000, bringing together Church leaders, political parties, government 
agents, and civil society representatives to foster support for human rights and promotion 
of peace.
112
 The peace conference, which was endorsed by Pope John Paul II, featured a 
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speech by “Bishop Matteo Zuppi of the Rome-based Sant’Egidio community,” who 
played a crucial role mediating the “peace agreement in Mozambique.”113 Credited with 
breaking the “taboo” of public debate, the central tenant of the conference was that the 
civil war in Angola did not have a “military solution.”114 While COIEPA in general, and 
CEAST in particular, continued to advocate for peace, they achieved little success in 
establishing and maintaining a dialogue between the MPLA and UNITA to bring peace to 
Angola and basic rights and freedoms to society. 
During the 1990s, state and rebel elite began to pursue an affiliation with the 
Catholic Church in order to bolster their own legitimacy. President Jose Eduardo dos 
Santos began to court the Catholic Church to legitimize his reign.
115
 To promote the 
public perception of his authority, he had one of his children baptized Catholic and 
invited Pope John Paul II to say mass in a stadium in Luanda.
116
 Dos Santos’ move to 
coopt Church support made it difficult for the Church to gain independent influence on 
society as it was previously perceived by society to be close to colonial state and now 
seen engaging the increasingly authoritarian state.
117
 The action of the MPLA elite can be 
read as an opportunistic move to use the Church to penetrate society, but it must also be 
recognized, that this would not be possible if the Catholic Church had not developed a 
recognizable level of embeddedness in society. Therefore, this is strong evidence for the 
Church as an advocate, and for the state as a gatekeeper. 
Progressively though the 1990s, Jonas Savimbi and UNITA also sought to use the 
Catholic Church to give increasing credibility to their cause. In 1991, a UNITA party 
congress called on continued support from the Catholic Church for upcoming national 
elections.
118
 In 2000 and 2001, UNITA engaged the Church in dialogue, and Pope John 
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Paul II urged the state to engage in peace talks with UNITA.
119
 However, by this time 
UNITA’s ruthless tactics had significantly discredited their cause locally and 
internationally.
120
 Church attempts to bring peace to a society were unsuccessful, in part 
because the gap between UNITA and the MPLA was hardened by the generations of war 
and atrocities. However, the efforts of the rebel elites to leverage the Church also 
demonstrate the level of moral authority they believed the Church possessed.  
Beyond the boundaries of Angola, the Catholic Church was forming into a more 
vocal and cohesive organization in Africa. Several bishops formed The Inter-Regional 
Meeting of the Bishops of Southern Africa (IMBISA) in the late 1970s as a direct result 
of Vatican II.
121
 By 1989, IMBISA issued its first declaration on human rights within the 
region.
122
 Another collection of African Catholic clergy, The African Synod of Bishops, 
issued a similar call for rights in 1994.
123
 These regional religious organizations provide 
further evidence that the Church saw social justice to be an integral part of its mission in 
the region, and advocated for society in accordance with the boomerang pattern.  
Recent papal communications to CEAST and Angolan bishops have failed to 
criticize the shortcomings of the state to provide social rights and public goods to its 
citizens. Speaking to President dos Santos and the bishops in 2009, Pope Benedict XVI 
offered a positive message referring to the regimes efforts to rebuild institutions and 
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 Addressing CEAST in 2011, he stressed overcoming ethnic divisions as 
an important step in extending human rights.
125
 Despite this mention of rights, Pope 
Benedict XVI did not publicly pressure the state to grant society the rights and freedoms 
called for in Vatican II. In doing so, he missed an opportunity to further the transnational 
advocacy the Church had developed over the previous two decades. 
The actions of the Catholic Church in Angola which have attempted to foster 
moral authority and embeddedness in society can be summarized as late to develop, 
inconsistent, and ineffective in securing peace and social rights for society. After the end 
of Portuguese rule, the Catholic Church did attempt to advocate for a society that was 
divided, at least partially, because of the Church’s failure to embrace society during the 
colonial era. Moreover, near the end of the twentieth century, the Catholic Church moved 
forward with Protestant Churches but did not coordinate consistently enough to unite 
society, which was represented by various faiths. Finally, despite advocating for peace 
and social freedoms, individuals within the Church, including some bishops and even the 
pope, bypassed opportunities to denounce state and rebel elite actions that marginalized 
society. The Catholic Church does have some level of moral authority in Angola, but not 
enough overcome the gatekeepers in Angola that have limited the influence of the Church 
and spread of social rights. 
4. Mozambique 
While the conditions of Portuguese rule in Mozambique were similar in severity 
and duration to Angola, the Catholic Church was able to respond somewhat earlier and 
more successfully compared to Angola. As the bishop of Beira from the 1940s through 
the 1960s, Sebastiao Soares de Resende was critical of the Church’s mistreatment of 
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 De Resende published the first Catholic newspaper in Mozambique, Diario 
de Mocambique¸ which was suspended in 1968 and eventually closed in 1971 due to its 
anti-Portuguese message.
127
 A later bishop of Beira, Jaime Pedro Goncalves was notably 
pro-poor: following the edict of Vatican II to conduct the mass in the vernacular 
language, he preached in the language of a local tribe rather than Portuguese.
128
 While the 
colonial manifestation of the Portuguese Church was just as oppressive as it was in 
Angola, individual bishops resisted this influence and spoke out against the tyranny with 
greater affect. This social advocacy gave the Catholic Church some moral authority and 
helped the society accept them as defenders of the national interest. 
Those who opposed Portuguese domination were often marginalized. Several 
priests who spoke out against the Church’s tolerance of abuses were accused of 
sympathizing with the rebel group known as the Mozambican Liberation Front 
(FRELIMO).
129
 The missionary group known as the White Fathers, active in 
Mozambique since 1945, left in protest in 1971 over the local Church hierarchy’s 
acquiescence and the Vatican’s silence regarding the treatment of African peoples.130 
While these protests were insufficient to cause the Church to abandon their alignment 
with the Portuguese state, the protests did help establish moral authority that would later 
bear fruit. 
After Mozambique achieved independence and FRELIMO gained access to the 
reigns of the state, a new dynamic emerged between the Church and state in 
Mozambique. Upon the 1974 investiture of the transitional government, President 
Samora Machel said “to decolonize the state means essentially to dismantle . . . systems 
which, as an integral part of the colonial state, were solely designed to impose foreign 
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domination.”131 The Catholic Church and its patronage certainly fit the description of the 
systems which Machel sought to dismantle. 
FRELIMO used the oppressive legacy of the Catholic Church as a rallying point 
for support. Reminding Mozambicans of the colonial regime and the use of the Church to 
justify their actions, FRELIMO villainized the Church and categorized it as against the 
national identity. However, foreseeing the inevitable fall of the Portuguese empire, a 
group of Catholic priests met in August of 1974 and consciously plotted how to transform 
the Church to an institution that represented the local populace. Their vision became a 
reality as a new generation of priests and bishops, native to Mozambique rather than 
Portugal, changed the face of the local Church hierarchy. Further, the new Mozambican 
Catholic Church, intent to avoid the mistakes of the past, took a stand to be independent 




As the FRELIMO transitioned from a liberation movement to a governing body 
they adopted a Marxist ideology opposed to religion.
133
 However, due to FRELIMO’s 
affinity to China, overt Soviet influence was absent, which left some philosophical 
latitude with regard to religion.
134
 Within this space, the Catholic Church began to make 
amends with the state in the late 1980s.
135
 Despite the long history of Portuguese rule and 
communist influence against religion, the Catholic Church resurfaced in Mozambique 
with credibility.  
The Catholic Church in Mozambique, like the Catholic Church in Angola, stood 
apart from Protestant churches because it did not affiliate itself with a political party. The 
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Mozambique Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM), which represented the Protestant 
community aligned with FRELIMO during the civil war, assigned blame to National 
Resistance Movement (RENAMO) alone for the impact war had on society.
136
 
Conversely, the Catholic Church blamed both RENAMO and FRELIMO for “atrocities 
against innocent civilian[s].”137 By refusing to take sides and witnessing the same 
struggle as society, the Catholic Church remained objective and credible in the eyes of 
the population. Speaking out against state violence was a significant step in becoming 
embedded in society and developing moral authority in Mozambique. 
The Catholic Church in Mozambique was outspoken in defense of society. 
Whereas the CCM did not regularly circulate letters on the civil war, the Catholic Church 
issued no fewer than twenty letters dedicated to social issues during the civil war.
138
 As 
the war in Mozambique intensified in the 1980s, the CCM adopted the view of the 
Catholic Church which resulted in an ecumenical call for peace talks between FRELIMO 
and RENAMO.
139
 Just as COIEPA broke the taboo of public debate in Angola, the 
Catholic Church opened conversation in Mozambique by defying the proclamation that 
banned the use of the name RENAMO for the opposition force.
140
 By acknowledging that 
the civil war was a two-sided conflict, with violence being propagated by the both the 
rebels and the state, the Church opposed the state narrative which blamed the rebels as 
the sole cause of civilian suffering. After Mozambique achieved independence, the 
Catholic Church consistently took advantage of opportunities to advocate for society in 
Mozambique in keeping with the boomerang pattern. 
                                                 






Sponsored by Rhodesia and South Africa, RENAMO led a 17-year insurgency in 
Mozambique, which ended in 1992.
141
 After a visiting the rebel stronghold in Gorongosa, 
Archbishop Goncalves realized that the neither side could achieve complete military 
victory and sought the help of the Community of Sant’Egidio, a Catholic organization, to 
mediate an end to the civil war.
142
 Over the course of three years (1989-1992), the 
Community of Sant’Egidio was able to persuade RENAMO to come to the table and 
convince the FRELIMO led government that the negotiations did not confer undue 
legitimacy to the rebels.
143
 The resultant Rome Peace Accords recognized RENAMO as a 
political party rather than as a rebel group and set up elections in 1994.
144
 Unlike 
attempted negotiations in Angola, the Catholic Church was able to draw upon moral 
authority to further national unity in Mozambique and further the freedom and rights of 
society under a democratic government. 
Later communications between the Holy See and Mozambique have reflected the 
Church’s mission and acknowledge the Church’s immediate challenges. Upon receiving a 
new ambassador from Mozambique in 2006, the pope exhorted the Church in 
Mozambique to continue to strive for human dignity and continue to develop educational 
and social ministries.
145
 In 2007, Benedict XVI noted the shortage of priests as a hurdle 
to serving the local community.
146
 These comments from the pope underscore a persistent 
attempt on the part of the Church to continue to become more embedded in society. 
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B. CONCLUSION  
The societies of Angola, Mozambique, and Brazil have each had a distinct history 
with the Church despite their common Portuguese origin. Unique circumstances in these 
countries have shaped differing perceptions and measures of moral authority in each 
society. Patronage within the Portuguese empire created a hurdle for the Catholic Church 
to overcome in its efforts to become embedded in each of these societies. Brazilian 
independence appears to be the first major event that caused a deviation in Catholic 
influence between these societies. Through an earlier dawn of independence, Brazil 
escaped from Portuguese patronage, enabling the Catholic Church more unfettered 
influence in Brazil than in Angola and Mozambique. Conversely, the Church was able to 
advocate for society vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes in Brazil based on the moral authority 
it had developed over time. This iterative process helped strengthen the bond between 
Church and society.  
The signing of the missionary Concordat of Portugal in 1940 constitutes a second 
substantial event which contributed to the variation between the remaining Portuguese 
colonies and Brazil. This document not only affirmed the unity of Church and state, but it 
favored the empire over the colony. Moreover, it reinforced the subjugation of Africans 
through the veil of missionary education. Indeed, the Catholic Church can be viewed as a 
tool of foreign power prior to the fall of the Portuguese empire. However, clergy opposed 
to colonial domination were able to salvage some credibility in Mozambique. The 
credibility that the Church built in Mozambique through indigenous clergy and 
advocating on behalf of the marginalized population manifested itself in increased rights 
and freedoms for society after the end of the civil war in 1992. The Catholic Church’s 
role in mediating the end of the war demonstrates both its acceptance and its moral 
authority in Mozambique. Conversely, in Angola, the Church’s multiple efforts to 
advocate for society show an increasing level effort and moral authority, but an inability 
to secure rights and freedoms for society.  
Through the evidence presented, one can see that the Church is more embedded in 
Brazil than Angola and Mozambique. However, the Catholic Church was still active 
Angola and Mozambique, which indicates that society has not rejected it writ large. 
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Moreover, while the Church developed some level of moral authority in both Angola and 
Mozambique, it was successful in advocating for rights and freedoms of society in one 
country, but not the other. This chapter has uncovered why there is variation in the moral 
authority of the Catholic Church between Angola, Mozambique, and Brazil. However, it 
has not sufficiently answered why these levels of moral authority have produced different 
outcomes vis-à-vis the success of the Catholic Church in advocating for social rights and 
freedoms. Given this information, the following chapter evaluates the countervailing 
forces which mitigate the influence of the Church to determine what other factors limited 
the capacity of the Church to promote social change. 
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III. STATE ACTION AND GATEKEEPING 
Every country, including the former colonies of the Portuguese Empire, has 
unique political circumstances that potentially impede the impact of the Church. In this 
context, the cases of Angola and Mozambique offer a valuable comparison, and will be 
the focus of this chapter. Brazil, having achieved independence earlier and having a 
society which integrated the former colonizers and subjects to a greater degree than 
African colonies,
147
 will be excluded from this analysis. Angola and Mozambique are 
both large African states that were ruled by Marxist regimes following independence and 
suffered civil war between state forces and externally supported rebels. The economic 
and political conditions between the two states have been significantly different. This 
chapter analyzes how these economic and geopolitical factors contributed to resistance or 
acceptance of Church influence. I argue that the civil war and economic resources in 
Angola have inhibited the Church’s capacity to influence society by providing a means 
for state and rebel elite to act as gatekeepers while the relative lack of available resources 
in Mozambique hindered the ability of the state to exclude Church influence.  
I hypothesize that competition for power between state elites and rebels in 
Angola, fueled by oil and diamond revenues, preempted the Church’s diffusion of 
Vatican II reforms because resource extraction supplanted popular legitimacy as the goal 
both the MPLA and UNITA. The effects of political leader’s prioritization of profit over 
provision of public goods, both in times of active fighting and in times of relative peace, 
undermined the Catholic Church’s advocacy for society. Conversely, the Mozambican 
civil war was fought for a purely political prize, devoid of resource-driven economic 
spoils. The lack of mineral wealth reduced the incentive to resist power sharing and 
increased the dependence of the state on other influences, such as neighboring states, the 
international community, and the Catholic Church. This explains why Angolan society 
was isolated by sovereign state gatekeepers in pursuit of power, as well as aspiring rebel 
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gatekeepers, while the rebels and state elite in Mozambique counteracted each other’s 
capacity to resist transnational influence. 
Traditional views of the gatekeeper have focused on the agency of the state as the 
actor most responsible for establishing barriers between society and transnational 
advocacy groups or international norms. However, given the recent history of civil war 
and reconstruction in both Angola and Mozambique, UNITA and RENAMO, the 
opposition groups during the time period of interest, must also be evaluated as 
gatekeepers in an attempt to understand the access society has to the international world. 
James Cockayne has noted that war and reconstruction often yield “criminal peace” in 
which non-state actors leave the state in place to govern the “upperworld” while they 
plunder the “underworld.”148 Conflict aids organizations like UNITA and RENAMO by 
eliminating potentially legitimate economic rivals, providing access to violent means of 
coercion, and facilitating the construction of coherent organizations required for strategic 
political and economic operations.
149
 UNITA successfully operated in this manner prior 
to the death of Savimbi under a “warlord strategy” in which they operated in “relative 
autonomy” within the borders of the state, but beyond the reach of its power.150 
RENAMO operated under a different strategy. Rather than coexist within the state, they 
attempted to combat the state using a “terrorism strategy” in order to force the “state to 
accommodate their policy preferences.”151 I contend that the presence of UNITA and 
RENAMO played a critical role in the marginalization of society in Angola and 
Mozambique by limiting access to external aid, including Church influence. However, 
the differences between the two rebel groups, and the resources available to them, are 
equally important when identifying how the Catholic Church has been able to support 
and influence society. 
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To illustrate the effect that the state, rebel groups, and resources have played on 
society in Angola and Mozambique this chapter will be divided into three main sections. 
The first section describes the background to each of the civil wars and their impact on 
society. The second section evaluates the impact resources had on each of the civil wars. 
The final section analyzes the involvement of the Catholic Church in the respective peace 
processes. This chapter aims to demonstrate that the Church is limited in its ability to 
produce rights and freedoms for society when gatekeepers have sufficient interest and 
ability to resist pressure from civil society and external actors. In other words, a 
gatekeeper can be strong enough to hold transnational advocacy groups and society at 
bay when resource rents provide a sustainable and lucrative alternative. Furthermore, 
non-state actors may be considered viable gatekeepers when they possess the ability to 
disrupt material or ideological support for society either in regions beyond the control of 
the state or in competition with the state. 
A. BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT 
The MPLA and FRELIMO, the ruling parties in Angola and in Mozambique since 
independence respectively, bear a superficial resemblance to each other. However, the 
differences between the two parties reveal that in Angola, the state was a product of the 
liberation conflict, while in Mozambique the civil war was a response to the repression 
by the post-colonial state. The primary rebel groups in Angola and Mozambique also 
appear similar. UNITA and RENAMO both struggled through a military insurgency 
against their Marxist state with some level of foreign backing. However, the presence and 
characteristics of resources in Angola and Mozambique provided different incentive 
structures for the rebel movements. In both states, there was a massive exodus of 
Portuguese skilled labor at the time of independence causing a vacuum of both 
administrative and economic capacity.
152
 However, the seduction of state and resource 
control present in Angola was not present in Mozambique because Angola had a more 
developed extractive sector than Mozambique. Consequently, the availability of 
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resources and transmission of state authority at the end of the Portuguese empire 
combined to shape the relationship between society and state differently in the two 
countries. 
In Angola, independence came with a cost. Rather than transferring authority, 
Portugal abdicated power. No heir was designated to head the new state. This vacuum 
invited a contest among the established liberation movements which erupted into a civil 
war. The MPLA had gained control of Luanda, the capital of Angola soon after 
independence and declared the dawn of the new state; almost immediately, UNITA and 
their allies produced counter claim of sovereignty as a competing state.
153
 After the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized the MPLA claim to statehood in 1976, 
international legitimacy matched the de facto control of the MPLA in the capital.
154
 
Regional and international powers also attempted to influence Angola as the newly 
formed country became a battleground in not only the Cold War, but also post-colonial 
struggle between white minority governments and black majorities in southern Africa. 
Cuba and the Soviet Union supplied troops and equipment to the MPLA while South 
Africa backed UNITA.
155
 The Catholic Church, along with Protestant churches in 
Angola, advocated for a democratic resolution to the power struggle between liberation 
movements as early as 1975.
156
 CEAST repeated this sentiment in 1989.
157
 Despite these 
attempts by the Angolan churches, specifically CEAST, to create a democratic peace, no 
agreement could be reached and sustained to unify the opposing Angolan forces.
158
 
Unfortunately, the fighting lasted throughout the end of the century.  
In Mozambique, independence had a milder side effect. While rival liberation 
movements positioned themselves for the ensuing departure of the Portuguese, 
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FRELIMO was picked as the successor to the Portuguese government.
159
 Unlike the 
violent competition in Angola, the transition from one government to another in 
Mozambique discouraged rebel movements from vying for state power. Despite the fact 
that both the MPLA and FRELIMO were Marxist ideological factions that came to power 
at the end Portuguese empire, they acquired power in different ways.
160
 RENAMO, 
unlike UNITA, did not become a resistance movement in Mozambique until after the 
country attained its independence. FRELIMO attempted to consolidate power through an 
internal purge of the party and eliminating other political parties in Mozambique; 
RENAMO formed from the leaders of these groups with the help of the Rhodesian 
government.
161
 Unlike UNITA, RENAMO did not have direct roots to the liberation 
struggle against the Portuguese empire.  
The civil war in Angola could have ended in a similar fashion to the conflict in 
Mozambique, but it did not. The MPLA and UNITA came to the bargaining table in 1991 
to restore peace in Angola shortly before FRELIMO and RENAMO met to end the war in 
Mozambique.
162
 However, Angola reverted to war after UNITA rejected the results of the 
national election in 1992.
163
 Conversely, the factions in Mozambique came to terms in 
1992, held an election in 1994, and have not seen a return to war since.
164
  Just as the 
resources that were present and available in each state shaped the two conflicts, they also 
shaped the peace process and resulting governance. Whereas the MPLA sustained its 
ability to act as a gatekeeper through continued rent extraction, FRELIMO’s unilateral 
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gatekeeping capacity waned through the late 1980s, giving rise to the influence of the 
Catholic Church and other transnational organizations.   
B. THE ROLE OF RESOURCES IN CONFLICT AND GATEKEEPING IN 
ANGOLA 
Mineral deposits, specifically oil, have created a lucrative incentive warring 
factions to compete control of Angola. As Steve Kibble and Alex Vines state, resources 
have made “Angola . . . worth fighting for.”165 The MPLA strategically sought to control 
the capital of Luanda to bolster its relative leverage against competing movements and 
commandeer the established oil industry.
166
 Oil deposits in Angola are largely located in 
offshore deposits.
167
 The deposits have been easily controlled by the state and beyond the 
reach of the rebels. In this sense, oil can be considered a “point resource,” meaning that it 
is “concentrated in a certain area.”168 Moreover, oil is also a “proximate resource,” 
meaning that it is “easy to access and control;” and that it is neither “obstructable,” nor 
“lootable,” meaning that it is not easily “blocked by opponents” or “conducive to 
potential looting by rebel groups.”169 In other words, oil was an economic prize, easily 
protected by the MPLA after they controlled the capital and became the global market’s 
access point to Angolan oil. 
The MPLA continuously excluded other actors, such as civil society, transnational 
advocacy groups, and international organizations, from influencing the termination of the 
civil war since the early 1990s. Consequently, Angolan society was “caught between a 
criminal state and a criminal insurgency.”170 After the Bicesse Agreement in 1991 that 
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lead to the failed election in 1992, and the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, which only provided 
a shallow and unstable peace until 1998, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos rejected calls 
from the international community to negotiate a peace settlement with UNITA.
171
 
Subsequently, more Angolans died between the failed election in 1992 and end of the 
civil war in 2002, than prior to the election, many of them due to insufficient food 
provision and basic public services.
172
 Political elites, powered by streams of revenue 
from oil and diamonds reinforced the ethnic cleavages in society rather than share power. 
One reason that contributed to the MPLA’s resistance to outside influence is that 
oil is particularly well suited for state dominated extraction and, in the case of Angola, 
societal exclusion. Just as the MPLA sought to guard oil from UNITA during the civil 
war, they have sought to protect oil revenue from society as a standard practice after the 
war. Aiding the government in this goal is the “enclave” quality that offshore oil 
possesses: economically, geographically, and politically, very few in society have access 
to oil and it creates very few linkages whereby other Angolans become stakeholders in 
the petroleum industry.
173
 Further, Angola founded the state oil company, Sonangol, in 
1976 and gave it a monopoly over the oil reserves in 1978.
174
 Sonangol, headed by dos 
Santos’ daughter, operates autonomously from government oversight and is not held 
accountable for its budget, creating a “black hole” for revenues in its dealings with the 
central bank and treasury.
175
 The personal, rather than bureaucratic, relationship between 
state owned oil and government finance is a secret held so tightly that neither society nor 
parliament are not allowed to know what the revenue and expenditures amount to.
176
 
Moreover, the World Bank reported in 1993 that the lax policies in Angola not only allow 
for corruption, but “have encouraged misuse of the proceeds from non-renewable 
                                                 
171Kibble, “Hearing the People’s Voice,” 95, 96. 
172Philippe Le Billon, “Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975–
2000,” African Affairs 100, no. 398 (1, 2001): 59, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/60555382?accountid=12702. 





resources . . . for non-developmental activities.
177
  Oil revenues have provided support for 
the gatekeeping capacity of the state against advocacy groups and society. 
Angola functions as a neopatrimonial rentier state, where oil revenues are limited 
to a narrow group of MPLA supporting elites at the expense of the majority of society.
178
 
This indicates that the low level of subsistence and freedom given to society is not a 
failure; rather it is the intentional product of the self-serving interest of the state elite. Oil 
revenues relieve the state of dependence upon society for revenue, which is then 
dispersed within a personal network rather than through programmatic investment. 
Termed “illiberal peacebuilding,” this “process of postwar reconstruction managed by 
local elites in defiance of liberal precepts regarding civil liberties, the rule of law, the 
expansion of economic freedoms, and poverty alleviation, with a view to constructing a 
hegemonic order and elite stranglehold over the political economy” is enabled by, and 
designed to benefit from, the elite control of oil reserves.
179
 The regime allows external 
intervention, but only if it supports the “status quo” and does not interfere with the 
“internal authority” of the MPLA.180 The state’s efforts to act in this capacity have been 
so effective that they have successfully inhibited foreign leaders such as U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton and Pope Benedict XVI from confronting obvious issues such as 
lack of democratic practice and human rights abuses while visiting Angola in the late 
2000s.
181
 President dos Santos and the MPLA elite effectively perform the role of the 
gatekeeper by deliberately keeping transnational and international advocates on the 
sidelines as well as limiting society’s access to oil revenues. 
Just as offshore oil stuffed the coffers of the MPLA, alluvial diamonds fed 
UNITA’s war effort in Angola. UNITA was the most prominent and durable liberation 
movement that competed with the MPLA. UNITA’s origins began prior to independence 
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and continued military resistance until 2002.
182
 Whereas UNITA may have once been 
considered an ideological resistance to Portuguese and MPLA domination, the rebels 
have since been characterized by pure greed. After losing the 1992 election, UNITA 
reverted to war in an effort to lay waste to the countryside and make the country 
“ungovernable” as a means to “plundering the country’s resources.”183 UNITA’s strategy 
capitalized on the “diffuse” nature of alluvial diamonds, meaning that they are “spread 
across the terrain of the country.”184 Furthermore, the fact that in Angola diamonds are 
“distant” from the capital or power base of the state, made it difficult for the state to 
“access or control” this resource.185 The availability of diamonds prevented the state from 
easily stopping UNITA’s profitable smuggling operations.186  Finally, the small stones 
are “lootable,” and provide significant value in small commodities, making them portable 
and concealable.
187
 These are the exact characteristics that a rebel movement can exploit 
to fund its own operation.
188
 However, the lootable nature of the diamonds also required 
increased centralization of the resource and UNITA frequently dislodged and displaced 
populations or forced them to work in the mines to harvest the stones under a watchful 
and unforgiving eye.
189
 Consequently, while diamonds were good for UNITA, they 
brought suffering, rather than economic freedom to society.  
The continual harvest of diamonds allowed UNITA to sustain the war effort after 
the goal of state capture had proven to be unrealistic. While they may have genuinely 
started as a liberation movement denied power by the MPLA, the diamonds available to 
UNITA provided an incentive to continue belligerent action rather than function as a 
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political party in a pluralistic state. Significant external political and economic action, 
combined with MPLA military advantages were not enough to convince UNITA to 
abandon war until the death of Savimbi.  
Whereas oil created a sanctuary for the MPLA, diamonds incentivized a campaign 
of destruction for UNITA. Underlying this discussion is the motivation for war in 
Angola: resources rather than people. State capture for the MPLA was not a means of 
liberation after the Portuguese left, but a quest for oil wealth. Similarly, UNITA sought 
diamonds rather than popular support. Oil created a strong economic impetus for the 
MPLA to protect, but also a “weak state structure” and a “sparse network” with very little 
in incentive serve or unite the populace.
190
 Conversely, diamonds increased the 
“feasibility” of sustaining the UNITA rebellion, even after state capture had proved 
unrealistic.
191
 The Catholic Church, without any leverage to restrain the MPLA and 
UNITA from using resource wealth to purchase arms, was only able to suggest peaceful 
alternatives. 
Unfortunately for society, diamond mining directly affected the population under 
its de facto control, unlike the enclave oil industry. The manifestation of this presence 
was that of a warlord, where UNITA preyed on the inhabitants of territory possessing 
diamonds, beyond the protection of the state.
192
 UNITA and MPLA were enhanced in 
their gatekeeper roles because they held power at negotiating table during the peace talks 
and held weapons in the time of conflict. Society was marginalized not only by the war, 
but also by the shape of the peace between conflicts. 
The decline of UNITA coincided with their limited access to diamond revenues. 
Buyers and regional actors, such as Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire, were complicit in 
smuggling operations either for profit or as a means to gain a comparative advantage in 
power over other state and non-state actors in the region.
193
 Until credible 
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countermeasures were installed in 1993, and subsequently enforced around 1998, UNITA 
was able to use diamonds as both a resource for wealth and as a currency with which it 
could buy arms from such actors.
194
 Increased UN sanctions against UNITA, depletion of 
existing sources, and increased government control over diamond rich areas through 
“scorched earth” campaigns near the end of the 1990s and early 2000s limited the 
resources of the rebels.
195
 Further, economic measures imposed by De Beers increased 
the risk and limited the market for smuggled diamonds.
196
 The constricted availability of 
resources and shrinking market in which to exchange diamonds for arms marginalized 
UNITA, but the incentive to continue fighting for Savimbi was stronger than the 
alternative of submitting to MPLA rule. Certainly, the MPLA’s brutal final campaign to 
deny UNITA diamonds and refuge weakened the rebel’s capacity to resist. However, 
when finally defeated, UNITA had not weakened the state’s hegemonic power over 
society. With its oppressive regime and oil resources intact, the MPLA was to remain 
unhindered by the Catholic Church or any other social advocate. 
While resources were a major motivation for war, the Catholic Church claimed 
that oil and diamonds were not the underlying cause of the war. Throughout the 1990s, 
CEAST described the cleavages between ethnic groups that had been manipulated “to 
reap political dividends” by both the rebels and state elite as the root cause of the 
conflict.
197
 In 1999, the Church assessed that the role of resources was an avenue for 
political elites, and foreign companies engaged in purchasing these resources, to “turn 
war into a lucrative business.”198 Therefore, the Church claimed that the war was not 
driven by desire for resources; rather, it was driven by political division and fueled by 
resources. Oil and diamonds sustained the gatekeepers in their efforts to marginalize 
society. 
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C. THE ROLE OF RESOURCES IN CONFLICT AND GATEKEEPING IN 
MOZAMBIQUE  
The mineral and resource sector in Mozambique was largely undeveloped and 
unknown at the time of independence.
199
 Starting with little infrastructure, the state 
controlled economy attempted to develop a skilled labor force, establish a viable mining 
sector, and effectively survey the national resources.
200
 Mozambique subsequently 
discovered quantities of minerals ranging from coal to gold, lead, lithium, and 
hydrocarbons.
201
 However, RENAMO was able to disrupt the expansion of the immature 
mining sector from a very early stage.
202
 Unfortunately, this tactic took a heavy toll on 
society, as the World Bank estimated in 1988 that Mozambique was the poorest country 
in the world.
203
 Mozambique’s resources were both “diffuse” and “distant,” creating a 
scenario where “obstruction” of resources was a tool that RENAMO successfully 
employed to take advantage of. 
Compared to the MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO had very few resources available 
because RENAMO was able to tailor a strategy to effectively exploit the situation. 
Whereas UNITA’s strategy focused on accumulation of diamond resources, RENAMO 
waged civil war through a strategy of denial. While the plentiful resources fueled conflict 
in Angola, “grievance” spurred the rebellion in Mozambique in which resource disruption 
ensured a stalemate or “military balance.”204 Therefore, the role of resource extraction 
contributed to the ability of both the state and rebels in Angola, but resource denial was 
significant to the war in Mozambique. The MPLA, both during and after the war, retained 
a “greater degree of autonomy and maneuverability” over their policies than FRELIMO 
due to resource revenues.
205
 The same can be said of UNITA compared to RENAMO. 
While the Catholic Church was unable to usher peace into Angola, a side effect of the 
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limited means of both parties in Mozambique was a reliance on the Church and other 
external actors for support. 
D. THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE PEACE PROCESS 
IN ANGOLA 
Early Church attempts to promote social rights were met with resistance. Prior to 
independence, traces of lay and ordained resistance to state domination can be seen in 
Angola. Three progressive priests, Jorge Sanches, A.F. Santos Neves, and Waldo Garcia, 
deported from Angola for their resistance to the state. Holy Ghost missionaries also 
signed a petition protesting the Portuguese colonial system. Pope Paul VI even met with a 
leader of the MPLA in 1971, over the protest of the Portuguese government.206 After the 
MPLA had taken the reigns of the independent state, they too acted as a gatekeeper and 
resisted the influence of the Catholic Church. 
The Gbadolite Accords in 1989 were the first of many attempted and failed peace 
agreements aimed at ending civil war. In spite of this botched agreement, the Catholic 
Church maintained that “the path to peace and national reconciliation involved 
democratic reform,” in Angola.207 This agreement reified divisions between the MPLA 
and UNITA, and established that criticism from the Church was unwelcome by the 
government.
208
 The MPLA claimed that CEAST’s espousal of a democratic solution 
favored the UNITA rebels rather than the incumbent single party state.
209
 The Marxist 
MPLA, which required all its members to renounce their faith or their party affiliation, 
not only criticized CEAST for its democratic stance, but also used its sovereign power to 
deny, limit, and delay Catholic missionaries’ entry to the country as retaliation for its 
opposition.
210
 Both preemptively and reactively, the MPLA acted as a gatekeeper to limit 
the influence of the Catholic Church and other religious organizations. 
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The Catholic Church had a conflict of interest supporting UNITA as an opposition 
party, but also condemning its atrocious actions against the population. Further, the 
MPLA frequently interpreted any call for dialogue or support of the democratic process 
the Church espoused as collaboration with UNITA.
211
 Evidence of the state’s intolerance 
at the Church’s democratic efforts include limiting visas for Catholic missionaries in 
1989 and shutting down the Catholic radio station, Radio Ecclesia, in 1999 for airing an 
interview with Jonas Savimbi, and again in 2001 for subversion.
212
 Throughout the civil 
war, the Church could speak out, which it frequently did, but could not bring both sides 
to agree to, and honor a peace deal. 
The democratic and pluralistic government that may have been possible if both 
the MPLA and UNITA had accepted the results of the 1992 election was less promising 
by the end of the century. Rather than seeking a peaceful, or at least discriminant, 
response to UNITA’s rejection of the election results, the MPLA distributed arms to party 
thugs in urban areas, leading to the massacre of many UNITA political supporters. 
Contributing to the decline of the peace process was a potentially fatal flaw in the 
negotiations: society was excluded from the peace talks in 1991 because only belligerent 
factions were given a voice.
213
 After the failure of the 1994 Lusaka Accords, dos Santos 
was not inclined to accept negotiations with Savimbi. UNITA, having pillaged the 




As the conflict continued, the Catholic Church continued to be rebuffed by the 
MPLA. When CEAST joined forces with protestant organizations in Angola to form 
COIEPA, they met resistance from the MPLA, who sought to discredit UNITA and 
refused to accept further negotiation with the rebels as a viable course of action.
215
 
Further, when CEAST sponsored the Movement For Peace in 2000, the state rejected this 
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movement as a hindrance to its “peace through war” strategy that was gaining support 
from international actors.
216
 The Church’s attempt to bridge the gap between the two 
movements was an unacceptable way forward for the MPLA. After the turn of the 
century, the state was bolstered in its capacity as a gatekeeper with international support 
aiding its ability to spurn the advocacy of the Church and voice of society. 
Throughout the civil war, the Catholic Church and other church organizations 
specifically offered mediation on multiple occasions in Angola. CEAST offered 
mediation in 1986, but did not receive a response. In 2000, COIEPA offered mediation, 
which was rejected by the state. Finally, after Savimbi wrote a letter to CEAST in 2001, 
expressing gratitude for their services, Catholic bishops from the entire South African 
region issued a joint response offering mediation directly between dos Santos and 
Savimbi, which was never accepted. While a meeting between the two leaders was more 
promising than continued warfare, CEAST stated later in 2001 that any meeting between 
the elite would be incomplete unless it included “representatives from other political 
parties and civil society.
217
 
E. THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE PEACE PROCESS 
IN MOZAMBIQUE 
Prior to independence, the Church hierarchy in Mozambique was still supportive 
of the unjust colonial system. Bishop Teodosio Clemente de Gouveia helped author the 
concordat of 1940 to support Portuguese patronage of the Church in the colonies.
218
 
Gouveia believed his work was for the “glory of God and Portugal,” leaving African 
subjects as a lower priority.
219
 Archbishop Alvim Pereira of Lourenco Marques diocese 
delivered a speech in 1961 telling locals that “it is acting against nature to want 
independence and to take part in movements for it.”220 Accusing FRELIMO of being a 
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terrorist organization, Pereira supported the fascist regime in Portugal and preached 
subordination to the locals as a matter of religious duty.
221
 The hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church, with notable exceptions, was a pillar of Portuguese control over Mozambique 
and therefore exhibited the characteristics more representative of a gatekeeper than an 
advocate. 
When FRELIMO took control of the state, they reacted to the advocacy and 
objections of the Mozambican Catholic Church in a similar way to the MPLA in Angola. 
From the FRELIMO perspective, criticism of their organization was tantamount to 
support for the opposition. The Church was critical of the FRELIMO regime on several 
fronts, including anti-religious Marxist ideology, education, and atrocities committed 
against civilians.
222
 Not only was the Mozambican Catholic Church critical of the 
FRELIMO regime when needed, but the Church was also able “to work together” with 
the state on social issues when the door opened for cooperation in the late 1980s, despite 
FRELIMO’s insistence that the Church’s call for dialogue was “profoundly 
unpatriotic.”223 Common ground proved to be important for the Church in Mozambique, 
as well as criticism. 
Despite the fact that Mozambique had been poor and underdeveloped, it had 
untapped resources which could be harvested if the war ended. Based on the dialogue 
between the mediators and the two sides during the peace talks, it does not appear that a 
share of the mineral wealth was a significant aim of RENAMO, as mining rights were not 
mentioned in the first hand description of the peace process written by Cameron Hume. 
RENAMO relied on its military action alone to provide leverage in negotiation in order to 
open up the one-party state and facilitate power sharing through representative 
government and an apolitical security force.
224
 RENAMO therefore wanted to secure 
political guarantees rather than resource concessions in exchange for agreeing to a cease 
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 Consequently, society was more likely to benefit from war termination in 
Mozambique than in Angola through improved governance due to checks on power and a 
peace dividend by removing the security threats to potential sources of resource wealth. 
While society suffered during the civil war in Mozambique, the conflict and subsequent 
peace deal reduced the capacity of the state to act as a unilateral gatekeeper. 
RENAMO could not have been driven by a motivation to capture resources 
because few, if any, were available in Mozambique prior to the 1990s. Foreign actors, 
specifically factions in Rhodesia and South Africa, sought to increase their relative 
political power by undermining the FRELIMO regime.
226
  Already beset by poverty, a 
significant drought-induced famine in 1991 and 1992 affected Mozambique and several 
surrounding southern African countries.
227
  While government and rebel forces were in a 
stalemate, many of Mozambique’s land locked neighbors (as well as Mozambique’s own 
population) were being starved because the war prevented the distribution of food aid.
228
 
Therefore, while resource wealth was the driving force in the continuation of the war in 
Angola, poverty and hunger contributed to the cessation of hostilities in Mozambique 
because regional neighbors, such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, pressured the two 
factions to cooperate with Church mediators to resolve the conflict.
229
 While the Catholic 
Church was not solely responsible for the improvement in rights and freedoms in 
Mozambique, the two gatekeepers of society in Mozambique, FRELIMO and RENAMO, 
effectively destroyed each other’s capacity to sustain resistance to transnational 
influence. 
FRELIMO has neither lost control of the state since the end of the civil war, nor 
have they systematically excluded RENAMO from a revenue source.230  This should not 
be mistaken for pure benevolence or Catholic social values permeating the regime, but 
                                                 
225Hume, Ending Mozambique’s Civil War, 71–83. 
226Ibid., 11; Serapião, “Church and Conflict Resolution,” 367–368; Jourdan, “The Minerals Industry 
of Mozambique,” 2. 
227Hume, Ending Mozambique’s Civil War, 91–93. 
228Ibid. 
229Ibid., 112–114. 
230Niño and Le Billon, “Fragility in Mozambique and Angola,” 88. 
 54 
should indicate that institutional guarantees demanded by RENAMO at the end of the 
civil war have benefited society and been reinforced through transnational actors.231 
While the war ended in a negotiated settlement after a military stalemate, RENAMO has 
failed to democratically overtake FRELIMO’s seat of power. Yet, when viewed from the 
lens of society vis-à-vis the state, RENAMO has established that FRELIMO is not the 
only stakeholder in Mozambique. Evidence for the rise of civil society can be seen in the 
economic impact of resources across the economy and transparency in the mineral sector 
targeted at “sustainable development and poverty reduction.”232 Moreover, Mozambique 
is following some of the recommendations and best practices promoted by the 
international community such as developing a model contract for future mineral 
concession developments.
233
 Since the end of the civil war, Mozambique has been 
seeking to attract foreign direct investment through liberalization rather than simply 
seeking rents.
234
 With the mineral sector becoming more important to the national 
economy,
235
 the inclusion of society stands in stark contrast to the resource governance in 
Angola. 
F. CONCLUSION 
By comparing the civil wars and regimes’ use of resources in Angola and 
Mozambique, a stark contrast becomes evident in the relationship between the two states 
and their respective society. Resource conflict and governance have marginalized society, 
including the Catholic Church, in Angola while an insurgent war and a paucity of 
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extractive capacity in Mozambique have given society leverage against the state. The 
Catholic Church has been ineffective at limiting the tyranny of the regime in Angola, but 
the Church mediated the end of the civil war in Mozambique. While the end of the 
conflict in Angola has offered little improvement the freedom and welfare of society, 
power sharing in Mozambique, a byproduct successful war termination, has allowed 
more space for the Catholic Church and society. 
I conclude that the resources available to states and rebels in these conflicts 
significantly altered the conflict and post war peace because they provided alternatives to 
a negotiated peace in Angola throughout the 1990s but little incentive to continue 
fighting in Mozambique. Material gain to facilitate political primacy motivated the 
MPLA and UNITA in Angola, each one acting as a gatekeeper over a portion of society. 
Savimbi, operating as a warlord over UNITA held territory, and dos Santos, funneling oil 
rents into patronage networks, remained sufficiently strong to resist Church influence. 
Whereas Angolan society suffered because the state and rebels had sufficient 
resources and incentive to sustain conflict, Mozambican society suffered during their 
civil war because neither the state nor the rebels had an asymmetric advantage in 
resources to subdue the other. While FRELIMO and RENAMO could both deny 
resources and influence to each other during the war, they could achieve a more 
beneficial result through peaceful power sharing. Therefore, they had an incentive to end 
the conflict and were limited in their capacity to act as gatekeepers after the war. 
I argue that the civil war and economic resources in Angola have inhibited the 
Catholic Church’s capacity to influence society while the circumstances in Mozambique 
hindered the ability of the state to exclude Church influence. This brings two significant 
questions into focus. First, does the moral authority of the Church, as discussed in chapter 
two, require a catalyst to open the door for social advocacy? More specifically, is moral 
authority a necessary, but insufficient condition to circumvent a gatekeeper within the 
boomerang pattern? Second, do resources affect transnational advocacy during post 
conflict reconstruction? More specifically, is the Catholic Church more apt to facilitate 
peace out of poverty than out of a society with resources?  In Angola, resource 
exploitation enabled war continuation and wealth concentration, whereas in 
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Mozambique, war termination enabled resource development social inclusion. The 
findings of this chapter suggest that resource revenues decouple state and non-state actors 
from society and Church influence. This effect may be magnified when both state and 
rebel elites have access to resources, but less likely when both parties can potentially gain 





States, the international political environment, and the Catholic Church have 
changed over time, altering the path of influence that the Church has on societies. While 
colonialism has served as a vehicle for the Church to spread its message, it has also given 
rise to European empires and the relative deprivation of social rights in the parts of the 
postcolonial world. The Church has had minimal influence in Angola with respect to 
promoting rights and freedoms for society, which has contributed to the extreme 
deficiency of social justice in Angolan society, compared to Mozambique and Brazil. 
Secular changes driven by political and economic forces have amplified the 
influence of the Church in some areas and dampened it in others. Brazil serves as an 
example of Catholic influence transcending boundaries and penetrating society whereas 
Angola demonstrates little influence of Church influence on its institutions. This thesis 
investigates the causes of the muted voice of the Catholic Church in Angola by 
evaluating the development of the Church and interaction of state resistance in Angola 
compared to Mozambique and Brazil. I find that the most significant factor limiting the 
influence of the Catholic Church in Angola is the resistance of state and rebel elite, in 
pursuit of lucrative mineral resources, to societal and external pressure. Whereas the 
Church was embedded in Brazilian society and gained moral authority in Mozambique, it 
did not have a firm foundation in Angolan society upon which it could transcend the 
gatekeeper of the state. 
This concluding chapter will summarize the four proposed hypotheses and 
expound upon their overlapping contributions to the poor state of social rights in Angola 
compared to Mozambique and Brazil. The following section will analyze what 
implications these findings have for contemporary societies, throughout and beyond the 
developing world. Further, this thesis suggests that an alternative view of the “resource 
curse” may warrant further investigation. Finally, as representative of the U.S. 
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government studying at the Naval Postgraduate School, I ask what implications this has 
for the United States in foreign policy and military affairs. 
B. HYPOTHESES EVALUATED 
This thesis examined four hypotheses that potentially explain the influence of the 
Catholic Church in Angola compared to Mozambique and Brazil, resulting in different 
levels of influence over the adoption of social rights and economic freedoms as expressed 
through the Second Vatican Council. The first hypothesis asserted that the Catholic 
Church was more thoroughly embedded in Brazilian society than in Angola and 
Mozambique, and was therefore more effective as an advocacy group within the 
boomerang pattern. The second hypothesis suggested that because the Catholic Church 
was an instrument of state control during under Portuguese colonial rule in Africa longer 
than in Brazil, Angolan and Mozambican societies rejected the Church after 
independence as a remnant of foreign domination. Third, I hypothesized that since elite 
competition for power was more intense and long lasting in Angola than Mozambique, 
the Angolan state and rebel elites acted effectively as gatekeepers, and therefore 
successfully repelled Church advocacy for social rights. The final hypothesis claimed that 
the Angolan elite exploited mineral resources to create an oppressive regime, which was 
unresponsive to social needs or reform, resisting the attempts of the Catholic Church to 
advocate for society. 
Regarding the first hypothesis, my analysis finds that the Catholic Church is 
deeply embedded in society and has been highly effective as a transnational advocacy 
group in Brazil. Despite a history marked by repression, Church efforts in Mozambique 
have built moral authority and achieved some increase in the rights and freedoms for 
society there. While the Church has developed some degree of moral authority in Angola 
during its civil war, it has been unable to use it to achieve social rights, even after the 
MPLA defeated UNITA in 2002. 
The Second hypothesis suggested that society in Angola and Mozambique 
rejected Church influence since the Catholic Church was used as an instrument of 
colonial domination. Church patronage during Portuguese colonial rule created conflict 
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of interest, which allowed the empire to exploit colonial subjects whilst sidelining the 
Church as a critic. As discussed in Chapter II, the Church recognized this problem, and in 
1622 promulgated the Congregation for the Propagation of Faith for future colonies, but 
remained dependent upon Portugal until its empire crumbled. Further, Catholic 
missionaries failed to evangelize inclusively to all ethnic groups in its colonies, 
particularly in Angola. By ignoring local ethnic groups, the Catholic Church failed to 
create a common national identity, which left rifts in Angolan society after independence. 
The third hypothesis evaluated whether or not elite competition for power, which 
was more intense and long lasting in Angola than Mozambique, enabled the gatekeepers 
to preempt the spread Catholic social doctrine. Lasting from the 1970s until 2002, the 
Angolan civil war was longer than the conflict in Mozambique. However, the evidence 
suggests that the duration of hostilities is the result of another factor rather than the cause 
of limited influence of the Catholic Church. In other words, the persistence of state and 
rebel gatekeepers was a symptom of resource exploitation, and not the underlying 
resistance to the constrained influence of the Church. 
The final hypothesis posed that the exploitation of mineral resources by the 
Angolan allowed them to create an oppressive regime, which was unresponsive to social 
needs or reform, resisting the attempts of the Catholic Church to advocate for society. I 
argue that Angolan state and rebel elite have drawn strength from the extraction of oil 
and diamonds, which contributed to their significant resilience as gatekeepers. The 
Angolan state, in its iterations as Portuguese colony, civil war belligerent, and postwar 
illiberal democracy, has been the most influential factor in the scarcity of social rights 
advocated for by Vatican II. This conclusion does not discount the effect of Portuguese 
colonial discrimination, nor do I claim that the resource endowment of Angola is 
deterministic in the relationship between state and society. However, the effects of oil 
and diamonds have bolstered the gatekeeper role of the elite in war, and have continued 
to fortify the state since it achieved victory. 
Angolan liberation movements, which had been fighting for independence during 
the later years of Portuguese rule, turned on each other after the end of the colonial 
regime. This war, fought along ethnic and religious lines, became a contest for control of 
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the state and resources. Elites from the MPLA and UNITA gained immense wealth from 
the conflict and had little incentive to lay down their arms when continued combat was a 
lucrative alternative. Following UNITA’s defeat after more than a quarter century of 
fighting, no domestic or international actor has been able to limit the MPLA’s pursuit of 
wealth, and consequently, their capacity as a gatekeeper. 
Mozambique, conversely, did not have mature resource base to exploit. 
FRELIMO, the heir to Portuguese rule in Mozambique, FRELIMO had many 
characteristics in common with the MPLA in Angola, but no available enclave resource 
to expropriate and exploit. Further, FRELIMO had to contend with RENAMO who 
exasperated the problem through a strategy of terrorism, making governance and 
development impossible within the territory it controlled. While the belligerent state and 
rebel forces in Mozambique found themselves in a stalemate, the Catholic Church 
manufactured an opportunity to mediate peace and improve social rights. 
The Catholic Church in Mozambique forged a new identity after the end of the 
colonial era by seeking a voice independent of the state and representing society. While 
social advocacy built moral authority, it also created friction between the Church and the 
state. After years of civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO, the Church was able to 
establish itself as a neutral party, and credible enough to serve as an unbiased conduit for 
negotiations. While the moral authority the Church built was necessary for mediation, it 
was not sufficient. 
In order for the Catholic Church to achieve improved social rights, it required an 
opportunity to gain leverage against the gatekeepers of society. The opportunity 
presented itself in the form of rebel movement that used child soldiers to pillage, murder, 
rape, and sabotage portions of society to undermine the government.236  This inherently 
destructive rebel movement appears to be a poor vehicle for Church influence. However, 
RENAMO did reduce the capacity for the state to act as a gatekeeper by proving it was 
unable to govern its territory. Unlike Angola, where the MPLA was able to continuously 
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finance its war against UNITA rebels until it achieved victory, FRELIMO was overcome 
as a gatekeeper. 
Brazil has not endured a civil war and post conflict reconstruction similar to 
Angola and Mozambique. Therefore, any assessment of the state as a gatekeeper would 
be within a paradigm of peace rather than war. While the period of interest for this thesis 
does not lend itself to analysis of peaceful governance, future research may be able to 
draw a relevant comparison between these three countries in times of peace if Angola, 
Mozambique, and Brazil continue to develop without conflict. 
C. QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The study of the Catholic Church in Angola becomes relevant when these 
conclusions are applied as potential factors in other conflict-affected states. The first field 
of study in which this thesis suggests increased scrutiny is on the role of non-state actors 
in national affairs. International non-state actors, such as the Catholic Church, can 
influence state and society through transnational advocacy. However, the conditions that 
inhibit or promote the influence of non-state actors in this role are poorly defined. 
Specifically, domestic non-state actors, such as rebel groups, receive much attention, but 
are rarely evaluated as gatekeepers. The capacity of such an actor to act as an additional 
gatekeeper, as UNITA did, or degrade the state gatekeeper, as RENAMO did, requires 
additional research and may help explain the resilience some states have to external 
influence. 
Second, the moral authority of Catholic Church, or any religious institution, 
requires further research to develop a useful operational theory that can be applied to 
assess when it will be effective. Embeddedness and moral authority of a Church can bear 
fruit, but this thesis finds that other forces limit its application. In the case of Angola, 
resource extraction enhanced the state’s gatekeeping capacity, making it impervious to 
Church influence. Therefore, a model to predict when moral authority, and transnational 
advocacy in general, can overcome barriers to influence would provide a useful tool in 
the study of transnational norms and human rights in post war reconstruction. Further, if a 
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state has an embedded religious organization with moral authority, it may preclude or 
resist the development of a gatekeeper.   
If moral authority alone is insufficient to overcome gatekeepers, this study 
suggests that catalysts to help religious institutions successfully secure improved rights 
for society need not be aligned with the moral teachings of the church. Atrocities 
committed by RENAMO certainly do not represent the values advocated by the Catholic 
Church, but they did force FRELIMO to negotiate. Further, poverty caused by poor state 
management, rebel disruption, and severe drought contributed to the Church’s 
opportunity to mediate in spite of increasing the level of suffering in society. While 
disruption of a gatekeeper appears to be a desirable objective for religious institutions, it 
also poses a potential moral hazard if one were to assume that a strong force countering 
the state is a good thing, even if it brings increased suffering to society. 
Third, the question of how successfully a Church with high moral authority can 
advocate for society cannot be answered without investigating individual societies.   
While this thesis focused on the Catholic Church, as a transnational advocacy group, and 
the state and rebel group, as gatekeepers, the agency of society was beyond the scope of 
my research. Linking society to rebel groups and representative organizations, such as 
political parties, could offer a more complete picture of moral authority and advocacy for 
social rights. To continue this project, one would need to take a more complete look at 
the factors society encountered when faced with the choice of religious beliefs or 
confronted with the choice to join a rebel movement. I do not intend to dismiss the active 
role of society in the boomerang pattern writ large, or the transmission of social values in 
Angola, Mozambique, and Brazil, however, the study of sacred values and cultural 
heritage in this context is outside the bounds of this thesis. 
D. RESOURCE CURSE REVISITED  
Along with the gaps in the literature identified above, this thesis also challenges 
the common conception of the resource curse. Some scholars commonly simplify the 
resource curse into a severed social contract between state and society where resource 
rents replace taxes as the most vital component of state revenue, and ultimately lessens 
 63 
the incentive for the state to respond to society’s demands.237  I contend that this is too 
narrow a focus when evaluating the political causes of the resource curse. When the 
boomerang pattern is applied, the resource rents not only sever the society from the state, 
but also from the international community. If resource revenues allow the state to isolate 
society from transnational advocates, society is more likely to suffer from an oppressive 
state. In other words, the state is not separated from society; the state separates society 
from the international community. 
Other scholars argue that structural economic factors surrounding resource 
extraction, such as poor linkages between sectors, inflation, and declining terms of trade 
cause contraction as part of the “Dutch Disease.”238  The phenomenon of economic 
stagnation that correlate exploitation of non-renewable mineral resources does not 
disprove the political ramifications of an extractive economy. Further, it bolsters the 
argument that the resource curse is not confined to the relationship between state and 
society. If economic links between the resource sector and international markets favor the 
conditions that create an enclave, then transnational actors are inherently relevant to the 
resource curse. The distinction between commercial interests, which favor extraction, and 
social or political interests, which may favor advocacy on behalf of society, is the salient 
point. Theoretically, commercial interests involved in resource exploitation will 
contribute to the state as a gatekeeper whereas other state or non-state actors may oppose 
the gatekeeper. 
The assertion that the resource curse fundamentally extends beyond state and 
society to include transnational actors needs to be tested further with a sample size 
beyond the case studies presented here. To determine any empirical correlation between 
transnational or international influence and production of nonrenewable resources, one 
would need to define quantitative measures of influence as well as clearly link advocacy 
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groups to these effects. This thesis suggests that levels of effective transnational 
advocacy will be lower in states where resource revenues fuel state or rebel gatekeepers, 
as in Angola, thus fulfilling the resource curse. The thesis also contends that gatekeepers 
will fail to resist transnational influence in countries where extractive rents are unable to 
sustain the gatekeeper. Mozambique provides an example of transnational actors, 
including the Catholic Church, United Nations, and neighboring states exerting influence 
in a state where the gatekeeper was unable to exploit resources due to an undeveloped 
mining sector and a destructive rebel force. 
E. RELEVANCE FOR THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
The influence of the Catholic Church in Angola, Mozambique, and Brazil is 
relevant to the United States foreign policy and the Department of Defense. To the extent 
that the U.S. military seeks to promote norms of democracy, social rights, and freedoms 
throughout the world the analysis in this case study should help illuminate opportunities 
for successful military partnerships and highlight conditions conducive to the effective 
use of aid in Africa and across the developing world. More specifically, if the United 
States can identify states in which potential gatekeepers are undermined by a lack of 
resources, then they can identify where western institutions may meet less resistance and 
have greater influence. 
States which have sufficient resource bases may have the ability to resist U.S. 
diplomatic efforts to buttress democratic institutions, advance economic development, 
and promote peace and security in accordance with the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-
Saharan Africa.239  While this thesis focused on oil and diamonds as the source of 
revenue that sustained the gatekeepers in Angola, policy makers must also recognize that 
petroleum and minerals are not the only sources of fuel for gatekeepers. Foreign aid from 
a patron state is one example of other income sources that may preserve and strengthen a 
state (or non-state) gatekeeper. Conversely, where the state is either unable to perform the 
gatekeeper role, or does not resist western influence, U.S. policy makers should recognize 
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that how they frame this interaction may impact how it is perceived by society. For 
example, western influence funneled through the state, like the Portuguese empire that 
supported the Church, may appear to be an imposition rather than an opportunity. 
However, when western influence appears in the form of a transnational advocacy effort, 
such as an NGO, it may offer more appeal to society. 
The Catholic Church is one of the oldest transnational western institutions with 
widespread influence in the world today. As the United States advocates for the spread of 
liberal democratic and economic institutions, foreign policy advisers would be wise to 
learn from the lessons that Church experiences have provided. While many Americans 
would not necessarily associate church and state, policy makers should recognize that 
some societies in the postcolonial world would make that association. In the case of 
Portuguese colonies, such as Angola, Mozambique, and Brazil, western influence may 
draw comparisons to imperialism and Church patronage. This association may not have a 
negative connotation in a place like Brazil where moral authority and embeddedness have 
proven that the Church represents the interests of society. However, in states such as 
Angola and Mozambique, western institutions may be unwelcome as they evoke a legacy 
of repression fought through nationalist and Pan African movements. 
As the Department of Defense embarks on its mission in support of U.S. strategic 
interests, it must recognize that within the boomerang pattern, the state and society of 
each partner nation may have opposing objectives. This dichotomy presents military 
policy makers and deployed forces with a difficult dilemma. If underlying goal is a 
liberal international regime but the partner nation displays illiberal governance, strategic 
communications and cooperative military engagements must adhere to a nuanced 
approach aimed at improving ties between the host government and society while not 
jeopardizing the relationship between states. An aggressive and divisive posture on behalf 
of the U.S. risks losing the influence that military interaction provides.   
In summary, the boomerang pattern is a useful paradigm for both academic 
inquiries into the relations between state and society. This thesis evaluated the Catholic 
Church as transnational actor aimed at influencing society in Angola, Mozambique and 
Brazil in order to promote social rights and freedoms in accordance with the 
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proclamations of Vatican II. Within this model, the role of the gatekeeper provides a 
distinctly antagonistic resistance to the interaction between transnational actors and 
society. This thesis examined state, rebel elite in Angola and Mozambique as 
gatekeepers, and determined that the MPLA was an effective gatekeeper in Angola 
because it had access to resource revenue that sustained and its resistance to transnational 
influence. If the findings of this thesis are indicative of a larger phenomenon, it suggests 
that a cause of the resource curse is society’s isolation from the international community 
rather than a divorce from the state. This thesis also suggests that any future U.S. political 
or military engagement should be evaluated within the boomerang pattern to understand 
the effects and perception of both the partner state and society. 
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